Essays on optimal allocation of resources by governments by Bishnu, Monisankar
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2010
Essays on optimal allocation of resources by
governments
Monisankar Bishnu
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd
Part of the Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bishnu, Monisankar, "Essays on optimal allocation of resources by governments" (2010). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 11417.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/11417
Essays on optimal allocation of resources by governments
by
Monisankar Bishnu
A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty
in partial fulllment of the requirement for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Major: Economics
Program of Study Committee:
Joydeep Bhattacharya, Co-Major Professor
Krishna B. Athreya, Co-Major Professor
Helle Bunzel
Arne Hallam
Rajesh Singh
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa
2010
Copyright c Monisankar Bishnu, 2010. All rights reserved.
 ii
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………..iv 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION.........................................................1 
CHAPTER 2. ON THE EFFICIENCY OF SINGLE WINDOW……………………..3 
1. Introduction……………………………………………………………..3 
2. The framework…………………………………………………………7 
2.1 Inefficiency under ENA………………………………………11 
2.2 Inefficiency under EWT……………………………………...15 
2.3 Some facts and figures……………………………………...19 
3. The structure of single window……………………………………...20 
                                3.1 Inefficiency under ENA and EWT………………………..22 
                                3.2 A more general framework……………………………….24 
                                       3.2.1 Inefficiency under ENA and EWT………………...25 
4. Conclusion…………………………………………………………….29 
References……………………………………………………………30 
Figures…………………………………………………………………32 
CHAPTER 3. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN EDUCATION IN THE  
                             PRESENCE OF CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES………..34 
1. Introduction……………………………………………………………..34 
2. The Model………………………………………………………………39 
                              2.1 Primitives…………………………………………………….39 
                              2.2 Trade…………………………………………………………43 
                              2.3 Competitive Equilibrium (CE)………………………………44 
 iii
                              2.4 Social Planner’s (SP) Solution…………………………….46 
3. Comparisons…………………………………………………………...49 
4. An example……………………………………………………………..55 
5. Conclusion……………………………………………………………...60 
Appendix………………………………………………………………..62 
      References……………………………………………………………..64 
      Supplementary materials……………………………………………..67 
 Figures…………………………………………………………………70 
CHAPTER 4.  STOCHASTIC GROWTH, EDUCATION SUBSIDY AND  
                             INVARIANT DISTRIBUTION…………………………………...72 
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………..…72 
2. Background…………………………………………………………….75 
                                2.1 Agent’s problem under education subsidy……………...77 
                                       2.1.1 Invariant state under the economy with  
education subsidy………………………………….81 
3. Presence of perfect capital market…………………………………..84 
                                3.1 Agent’s problem under perfect capital market………….86 
                                       3.1.1 Invariant state under a perfect capital market…..88 
4. Observations…………………………………………………………...88 
5. Conclusion……………………………………………………………...94 
References……………………………………………………………..95 
      Appendix……………………………………………………………….99 
 
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Words are not enough to express my sense of gratitude towards Professor Joydeep
Bhattacharya. He has always been a great inspiration to me. His clarity of economic
thought and unique approach to a problem was a great stimulation. Whatever little I
have learned from him will denitely be an asset for the rest of my life. I am deeply
indebted to him. I have also been extremely fortunate to get the opportunity to work
under the guidance of Professor Krishna B. Athreya. His support and encouragement
were a great motivation behind the completion of my doctoral thesis. I would like to
express my sincere gratitude to him. I believe that whatever I have been able to learn
from him will help me immensely in my future endeavors. I would like to thank Professor
Helle Bunzel for her extremely useful suggestions on my research. I am indebted to
Professor Arne Hallam for his generous suggestions on my research; without his help, my
research would not have been completed. I am grateful to Professor Rajesh Singh with
whom I have had many useful discussions on di¤erent issues. I admire his encouragement,
enthusiasm and humor.
I am indebted to my parents, Tara Sankar and Gita Bishnu, for their continuous sup-
port and encouragement. The inspiration, patience and devotion from my wife Sonali
were invaluable. I must also thank my elder brother Dip Sankar, without whose encour-
agement I would not have ventured into economics. My little daughter Beas entertained
me whenever I needed a break from studying. I also owe a lot to my extended family
members and friends.
1CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Allocation of resources is a fundamental issue in economics. My thesis is on how
the government can optimally allocate the available resources so that the economy can
exploit its benets to the fullest extent. In Chapter 2, the issue of how labor resources
can be optimally allocated across di¤erent governmental agencies is discussed. The main
focus is to study how the e¢ ciency of government activities depends on the allocation
of labor resources by the government. This analysis is very time appropriate and crucial
from the e¢ ciency point of view. More specically, the idea of this chapter is as follows.
In many countries, the process of obtaining government approval for di¤erent projects
involves interaction with multiple government agencies at various levels. This often
makes the approval process ine¢ cient by unnecessary lengthening it. In this paper we
study the e¤ect of a re-organization of the approval process towards making it a single
window clearance system, on the e¢ ciency of the entire process.
In Chapter 3, the rationale behind government intervention in education in the pres-
ence of consumption externalities is studied. Government intervention in education,
typically in the form of education subsidies, is ubiquitous. The standard rationale for
such intervention is a human capital externality: people are smarter if they are around
smart people. The intergenerational counterpart of this observation is that a smarter
generation produces a smarter future generation. This paper argues for government
intervention in education even when no human capital externalities are present. To
that end, a neoclassical overlapping generations model of human and physical capital
accumulation is studied. Children borrow from perfect capital markets to fund educa-
tion expenses. When middle-aged, they earn income from human capital, and save in
the form of physical capital. Agents are assumed to care not just about the level of
their consumption but how that compares to those (from among their peers and the
2other consuming generation) living around them. Such an intra and intergenerational
consumption externality is responsible for the possibility that agents may over or under-
accumulate human and physical capital relative to a planner, thereby justifying public
intervention.
Finally, Chapter 4 investigates how an economy with production shock behaves in
the long run under the presence of government subsidy in education. A growth model
is considered where human capital in each period is generated using the human capital
available from the previous generation as well as an education subsidy. The education
subsidy is made available through a generational transfer mechanism where tax is col-
lected from the working class and passed on to the new generation. The nal good in
the economy is produced using both physical and human capital. However, the produc-
tion process is subject to a periodwise shock. In this stochastic framework we dene a
balanced growth path where the distribution of the ratio of two capital stock converges.
The conditions under which this invariant measure exists and is unique are completely
specied. The tax rate for which this benchmark economy follows the same growth
path as a complete market has been studied. It has also been shown that the invariant
distribution for an economy with a tax rate lower than this First Order Stochastically
Dominates the invariant distribution of a complete market.
3CHAPTER 2. ON THE EFFICIENCY OF SINGLE WINDOW
Modied from a paper published in Economic Theory
Krishna B. Athreya and Monisankar Bishnu
1 Introduction
In the last decade or so, growing economies like India are emerging as important players
in the global arena. Globalization has led to an increased interaction with the world.
There is a growing willingness among foreign investors to invest in India, just as the
number of Indian citizens eager to conduct business with foreign countries is increasing.
All this is well because it leads to an overall increase in economic activities which in
turn triggers higher growth of a country. But what has been observed in countries like
India is that the sluggishness and ine¢ ciency of the government bureaucracy is a major
hurdle in the path of development. Indeed, as observed by Athreya and Majumdar
(2005), this feature is shared by many developing countries. Our particular area of
focus is the relative ine¢ ciency of the system of multiple approvals which is in place in
many developing countries. To be more elaborate, increase in economic activity within
a country leads to more people applying for passports, investors applying for approvals
for new projects, potential exporters applying for a license etc. They have to approach
the government bureaucracy, which is the sole custodian of granting approvals.
An investment proposal, for example might need to be assessed from various angles.
While it is necessary to ascertain whether the project is nancially viable, it might also
be important to conrm whether the project poses any environmental hazard. It is
4natural to expect that the people with the expertise to judge the nancial aspects of an
investment project may not be the best ones to assess its environmental implications.
Hence, an investor has to approach di¤erent bureaucrats in di¤erent establishments for
approval before being able to go ahead with the project. This system is technically
referred to as multiple windows. However this decision making process of granting ap-
provals, which comprises of a series of substantially meaningless scrutinies(Bhagwati
1973), is generally very slow. This is largely due to a lack of coordination among the
di¤erent government agencies involved. For example, in order to be able to export, an
Indian citizen needs to acquire 257 signatures and 118 copies of the same document.
This involves dealing with di¤erent Government of India agencies separately. The mag-
nitude of the delay resulting in the process is reected by the fact that 118 copies of the
same document need 22 hours to key punch! (See Roy 2003; Athreya and Majumdar
2005).
The World Bank reports Enterprise surveys (2008) and Doing Business (2008)
reveal that most developing countries have not been able to create an environment
where it is easy to conduct business. According to the Doing Businessreport, which
ranks countries according to the ease of doing business there, out of 178 countries,
the ranks of China, India and Brazil are 83, 120 and 122 respectively. As an example,
getting various approvals for building a warehouse takes on an average 224 days in India,
336 days in China and 411 days in Brazil, whereas the average in US and Canada are
40 and 75 days respectively. According to Enterprise surveys report, percentage of
senior management time spent dealing with the requirements of government regulation
is 6.66% for India, 7.19% for Brazil, 18.3% for China and 20.49% for Mexico whereas
the OECD average is only 2.97%. The delay caused by having to deal with di¤erent
agencies or windowsoften results in the country being deprived of good investment,
5as some foreign investors frustrated by the sluggishness and opaqueness of the process
decide to take their project elsewhere. Let us dene social welfare as the sum of the
benets from di¤erent projects. If the benet from a project is the cost of waiting for
approval in the queue in the steady state subtracted from the gain from approvals, then
one of the decisive factors in the measurement of social welfare is the waiting cost which
in turn depends on the waiting time at the steady state. Thus, a long waiting time in
the queue has the undesirable e¤ect of lowering social welfare. To counter the negative
impacts of a multiple window approval system, policy makers emphasize the importance
of a single window1.
In this paper we show that single window clearance is more e¢ cient than the prevail-
ing systems of multiple approvals, where e¢ ciency is dened in terms of both expected
queue size and expected waiting time in a stochastic equilibrium. Not only that, for
some parameter values, we nd that as the rate of incoming applications increases, the
gain in e¢ ciency achieved under a single window clearance system over all other systems,
in the steady state, actually increases2. This observation is all the more signicant for
emerging countries like India, where the number of people willing to invest (and hence
the number of applications) is on the rise. Hence the case for adopting the single
window system is even stronger.
It is not as if the government is unaware of the need to implement a single window
clearance system. In spite of this, not much progress has been made in this direction.
1According to the Recommendation No. 33 (New York and Geneva 2005) of Recommendation and
Guidelines on Establishing a Single Window, prepared by the United Nations Center for Trade Facili-
tation(UN/CEFACT), a) as the single window enables governments to process submitted information,
documents and fees both faster and more accurately, traders should benet from faster clearance and
release times, enabling them to speed up the supply chain. In addition, the improved transparency and
increased predictability can further reduce the potential for corrupt behaviour from both the public and
private sector. b) Major benet for the government inludes more e¤ective and e¢ cient deployment of
resourcesand increased integrity and transparency.
2However, we suspect that this result holds for all possible values of the parameters. The result can
be shown to hold easily when the service rates of the two governments are equal.
6One of the main reasons that is cited for this lack of an a¢ rmative action towards this
end is corruption in the government circles, and an unholy nexus between the politicians
and bureaucrats. The research on single window policy has gained momentum very
recently and one of the rst of its kind is Athreya and Majumdar (2005). More recently,
Lambart-Mogiliansky, Majumdar and Radner (henceforth L-M-R 2007, 2008) and Yoo
(2007) presented a game theoretic approach to analyze single window policy in the
presence of corruption. However, there might be another possible explanation for this
inaction. The age old structure of the government in countries like India, typically
overemploys labor. It is sometimes the fear in the government circles and a general
public perception that any re-organization might result in loss of government jobs, that
prevents any populist government from taking any drastic decision. Unemployment is a
very sensitive issue for any populist government in a developing country. Any decision
that might be generally perceived to have a negative e¤ect on employment may hamper
the chances of that government coming back to power in the future. This breeds and
nourishes ine¢ ciency in the approval process. We claim that the re-organization required
to increase the e¢ ciency of the approval system does not have to result in any loss of
jobs. We present a simple queue theoretic framework to present our claims. Thus in
order to boost the growth progress, it is the duty of government to raise the level of
awareness among its own o¢ cials as well as the general public. This requires a strong
political will to change the way of functioning of the government bureaucracy, and the
sooner it comes the better.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our model in
an M/M/ (.) framework and subsequently in the subsections 2.1 and 2.2, we show that
under two di¤erent measures of ine¢ ciency, a single window scores better than the other
existing approval systems. In subsection 2.3, we investigate the relationship between the
7ine¢ ciencies of the di¤erent approval systems and the arrival rate as well as the service
rate at the steady state for di¤erent parameter values. In section 3, we compare di¤erent
structures of a single window clearance system and justify why the extreme version of
the single window setup has been chosen for our discussion in section 2. In subsection
3.1, we present a simple M/M/ (.) framework to produce our results while in subsection
3.2, a more general M/G/ (.) framework has been considered. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Framework
In this section we discuss three di¤erent systems of approval, and evaluate them in terms
of their e¢ ciency. As noted previously, under a multiple window approval system, the
applicant has to deal with a number of separate agencies like the local governments, the
federal government, the central bank etc. In this paper, we assume for the sake of sim-
plicity that under a multiple window approval system, the applicant has to deal with two
separate agencies, namely the local government and the federal government (henceforth
referred to as LG and FG respectively). We also assume that all applications are homo-
geneous, i.e., one application is no way di¤erentiable from the other. Furthermore, both
FG and LG are assumed to have the capacity to receive innite number of applications.
The three systems of approval that we discuss are as follows:
Simultaneous approval system (SIS): Under this system, an application is approved
if and only if it is passed independently by both FG and LG. This might happen in cases
where the project involves issues which lie under the jurisdiction of both the local and
the federal governments. Under SIS, arrivals of applications to both the governments
are Poisson processes with rate . The service process of the FG and LG are also Poisson
processes with rate f and l respectively, where subscript f stands for the FG and l
8for the LG. The arrival process of applications to FG is assumed to be independent of
the arrival process of applications to LG. The service process of applications of FG is
also assumed to be independent of the service process of applications of LG, i.e., the
service times are mutually independent random variables with distribution functions
exponential(f ) and exponential(l) respectively. Furthermore, the arrival process of
applications is independent of the service process for both FG and LG.
Sequential approval system (SES ): Under this system, a project has to be rst ap-
proved by the FG and then by the LG in order to be executed. Thus, an application
comes before the LG for approval only if it has already been approved by the FG. This
sequential form of clearance is also a common form of governmental approval process in
some countries. Under SES, the arrival process to the rst window, here the FG, is a
Poisson process with rate . The service rates of both FG and LG are exactly identical
to that in SIS. Just as in SIS, the service process of applications of FG is assumed
to be independent of the service process of applications of LG, i.e., the service times
are mutually independent random variables with distribution functions exponential(f )
and exponential(l) respectively. The arrival process of applications is also independent
of the service process for FG.
Single Window approval system (SWS ): Under this system, an applicant has to deal
with only a single establishment in order to get approval for the project. This single
window approval processing institution may be a separate agency3 as well. Here, the
3According to the Recommendation and Guidelines on Establishing a Single Window to en-
hance the e¢ cienct exchange of information between trade and government, Recommendation No.
33 (New York and Geneva 2005), prepared by the United Nations Center for Trade Trade Facili-
tation(UN/CEFACT), The appropriate agency to lead the establishment and operation of a Single
Window will vary from country to country depending on legal, political and organisational issues. The
lead agency must be a very strong organisation with the necessary vision, authority (legal), political
backing, nancial and human resources and interfaces to other key organisations. However, the lead
organisation does not necessarily have to be a governmental organisation; it can be a private entity such
as a Chamber of Commerce or a semi-state organisation such as a Board of Trade. However, private
organisations sometimes lack the legal authority to issue and accept information and documents and the
9arrival process to the single window is Poisson with rate  and the service process is also
Poisson with rate [1
2
( 1f + 
 1
l )]
 1. Under SWS we assume that the arrival process of
applications to the single window is independent of the service process.
The justication behind choosing this particular rate for SWS is as follows. The
arrival rate of applications is , because one can think of applications under this policy to
be a one single complex license(see for e.g. L-M-R 2007) that takes care of everything.
However, each application requires exponentially distributed amount of time with mean
 1f from the FG and 
 1
l from LG. Therefore, a single window can process applications
at a rate [1
2
( 1f + 
 1
l )]
 1 by appropriately using its labor force. For example, if the
service time of approval by both the FG and LG are exponentially distributed and the
mean service time to process their parts of an application is say one month for both
the governments, then we argue that to process a full application, the mean service
time required by a combined approval under SWS is simply one month. This rate of
service can be achieved by re-organizing the workloads on the existing employees of
the FG and LG, without a¤ecting the total employment level. Further, a SWS also
eliminates the problem of lack of coordination that often exists between two di¤erent
government agencies, to some extent. It also seems logical to assume that when there is
a gap between the e¢ ciencies, working with the more e¢ cient labor may help improving
the quality of the less e¢ cient labor force. Thus we expect that under the SWS, a
single agency may have some e¢ ciency gain through e¤ective and e¢ cient deployment
of resources(see footnote 1) when all the processes take place under a single umbrella.
Later we also carry out our analysis under the assumption that the expected service
power to enforce rules. Therefore, in such a scenario, it may be necessary for the private organisation
to seek the explicit formal support of a governmental organisation that has such power at its disposal.
One example of a public-private partnership that led to the establishment of a Single Window was
the Mauritius Network Services Ltd in Mauritius. This is a tripartite joint-venture company involving
public and private sector representatives and a foreign technical partner.
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time of SWS is the maximum of the expected service time (hence the minimum of the
service rates) of the two governments. That is, if the service time of the FG and LG are
exponentially distributed and the mean service time required to process an application
is say one month and two months respectively, then we assume that a SWS has a mean
service time of two months, which is the maximum of the expected service times of the
two governments. We show that the change in the assumption about the service time of
a SWS does not lead to any change in our result. The structure of the model ensures
that any possible re-organization of the bureaucracy due to a change in the approval
system does not result in any unemployment.
For both SIS and SES, dene i =
i
i
, i = f; l as the occupation rate. For the
existence of the steady state, we assume that i < 1; otherwise the mean queue length
explodes. For SWS, dene the occupation rate as [1
2
( 1f + 
 1
l )] and for existence of
the steady state, we assume that [1
2
( 1f + 
 1
l )] < 1.
In the following subsections we present two di¤erent measures of ine¢ ciency. We
then evaluate SIS, SES and SWS according to these measures. In subsection 2.1,
we present the rst measure of ine¢ ciency namely the expected number of applications
in the system at the steady state (henceforth ENA). The second measure, which is
the expected waiting time of an application in the steady state (henceforth EWT ), is
presented in subsection 2.2. The reason behind choosing these ine¢ ciency measures
is that if the length of the queue in the steady state is long, it essentially implies a
potentially greater loss of productive activity. A longer mean waiting time in the steady
state also has the same implication on social welfare.
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2.1 Ine¢ ciency under ENA
A stochastic equilibrium, i.e., an invariant or steady state distribution  = (n) of the
queue size exists for each of the queues dened in SIS . Each of the queues in SIS is
M=M=1 in the language of Queueing Theory. From the above description, it is clear that
the transition rates for each of the queues under SIS are qi(n; n+1) =  and qi(n; n 1) =
i; i = f; l where qi(n; n+ 1) and qi(n; n  1) are the birth and death rates when there
are n applications in the system. Therefore the form of the steady state distribution for
each of the queues in SIS is given explicitly by n = Pr[X = n] = (


)n(1  

) = n(1 )
( Durrett 1999; Klienrock 1975). Note that given the irreducibility,  is approximately
the distribution of the queue size for large t; i.e., n = limt!1 Pr[X(t) = n] where X(t)
is the number of applications in one queue at time t. Furthermore, in the steady state,
the average number of applications in the system, limt!1 1t
R t
y=0
X(y)dy = EX holds
w.p. 1. So under SIS , the expected number of applications in the system for each of the
two queues is given by
EX i =
1X
n=0
n(i)
n(1  i) =
i
(1  i)
; i = f; l
We are now interested to nd out the maximum length of the two queues under SIS
at the steady state. This measure is chosen because even if the number of steady state
applications still waiting for approval from one government is low, applicants will have
to wait longer because of the other relatively less e¢ cient government. We measure the
ine¢ ciency of SIS by the expected number of applications still awaiting approval in the
steady state and denote it by ENA(SIS ). Given that the applications are homogeneous
and the two processes are independent, we have
12
Pr[maxfXf ; X lg = n] = Pr(Xf = n;X l = n) + Pr(Xf = n;X l 5 n  1)
+Pr(X l = n;Xf 5 n  1)
= nf
n
l (1  f )(1  l) +
n 1X
m=0
nf (1  f )ml (1  l)
+
n 1X
m=0
nl (1  l)mf (1  f )
= nf
n
l (1  f )(1  l) + nf (1  f )(1  nl ) + nl (1  l)(1  nf )
Therefore the expected maximum number of applications still awaiting approval in
the steady state is given by
E[maxfXf ; X lg] = (1  f )(1  l)
1X
n=0
n(fl)
n +
1X
n=0
n(1  f )nf +
1X
n=0
n(1  l)nl  
1X
n=0
n(1  f )(fl)n  
1X
n=0
n(1  l)(fl)n
=
1X
n=0
n(1  f )nf +
1X
n=0
n(1  l)ns   (1  fl)
1X
n=0
n(fl)
n
=
f
(1  f )
+
l
(1  l)
  fl
1  fl
Thus
ENA (SIS )  E[maxfXf ; X lg] = f
(1  f )
+
l
(1  l)
  fl
1  fl
Under SES , once the applications are served by FG, they come to LG for approval.
Note that the the queue faced by FG is una¤ected by the queue that LG faces. We
assume  < i, i = f , l for a steady state to exist. The queue faced by FG is therefore
13
an isolated queue with arrival rate  and the approval rate f . The departure from
FGs queue forms the arrival to the LG. But this departure forms a Poisson stream
with rate . Therefore the queue that LG faces is just like a queue where the arrival
rate is a Poisson stream with rate  and the service rate as we assumed is l. If X
f (t)
and X l(t) represent the number of applications in the steady state for FG and LG
respectively, then nf ;nl = Pr[X
f = nf , X l = nl] = Pr[Xf = nf ] Pr[X l = nl] and
therefore, nf ;nl = (f )
nf (1   f )(l)nl(1   l). Given the steady state distribution, we
can easily nd out the expected number of applications that are awaiting approval in
the steady state and which is given by
E[Xf +X l] =
X
nf
X
nl
(nf + nl)(f )
nf (1  f )(l)nl(1  l) =
f
(1  f )
+
l
(1  l)
Hence the ine¢ ciency of SES , denoted by ENA(SES ), is
ENA (SES ) =
f
(1  f )
+
l
(1  l)
Now we discuss the steady state of SWS . Under SWS , the arrival forms a Poisson
process with rate  and the service rate is also Poisson with a rate [1
2
( 1f + 
 1
l )]
 1.
The steady state distribution is given by
n = Pr[X = n] = (

[1
2
( 1f + 
 1
l )]
 1 )
n(1  
[1
2
( 1f + 
 1
l )]
 1 ) = (
)n(1  )
where  = [1
2
( 1f + 
 1
l )]. Hence the expected number of applications that are still
pending in the steady state is given by

(1  ) . We denote the ine¢ ciency under SWS
14
by ENA(SWS ), where
ENA(SWS ) =

(1  ) =
1
2
(f + l)
1  1
2
(f + l)
Given the above results, we prove the following proposition easily.
Proposition 1 If the ine¢ ciency of an approval system is measured by ENA, the policy
SWS is the most e¢ cient, followed by SIS and SES , i.e., ENA (SWS ) < ENA (SIS ) <
ENA (SES ).
Proof. Note that 
(1 ) is an increasing function of . Hence, clearly

(1  ) 5 maxf
f
(1  f )
;
l
(1  l)
g (1)
But
maxf f
(1  f )
;
l
(1  l)
g  f
(1  f )
+
l
(1  l)
  fl
1  fl
(2)
as both
l
(1  l)
  fl
1  fl
and
f
(1  f )
  fl
1  fl
= 0. Also
f
(1  f )
+
l
(1  l)
  fl
1  fl
<
f
(1  f )
+
l
(1  l)
(3)
Thus by combining the above three inequalities, we have

(1  ) <
f
(1  f )
+
l
(1  l)
  fl
1  fl
<
f
(1  f )
+
l
(1  l)
i.e., ENA (SWS ) < ENA (SIS ) < ENA (SES ).
Now let us change the assumption regarding the service rate of a SWS: Instead of
[1
2
( 1f + 
 1
l )]
 1, let the service rate be min  minff ; lg; while the arrival rate is
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xed at the same level of . We denote the ine¢ ciency of SWS associated with the
service rate min by ENA (SWS )
min.
Proposition 2 Under ENA, a SWS policy with service rate min  minff ; lg is also
more e¢ cient than the SIS and SES , i.e., ENA (SWS )min < ENA (SIS ) < ENA (SES ).
Proof. The expected number of applications awaiting approval in the steady state
is ENA (SWS )min =
min
1  min
, where min, with slightly abuse of notation, is the 
associated with min. Note that
min
1  min
= maxf f
(1  f )
;
l
(1  l)
g. Thus the rest of
the proof follows directly from the proof of proposition 1.
This proposition essentially means that even if the service rate of the single window
is the minimum of the rates at which the two windows process applications in a multiple
window system, single window is still the more e¢ cient approval system. The overall
minimum service rate can be achieved by downsizing the total labor force. But this could
reduce the employment level of an economy. Alternatively, it is possible to o¤er the
minimum service rate with the same number of employees with a less average workload
on each employee. Thus an e¢ cient system through reorganizing the labor force may be
achieved even by working less.
2.2 Ine¢ ciency under EWT
The second measure of ine¢ ciency is the expected waiting time of an application in the
steady state. Under this measure too, we reach the same conclusion as above that a
single window is the most e¢ cient approval system. Let Wk be the service time of the
kth application and X be the number of applications in the system just before the arrival
of an arbitrary application. Let Sn denote the total time that the nth application spends
in the system, where total time is dened by the waiting time plus the service time. We
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are interested to nd out the mean waiting time of an application at the steady state.
The limiting distribution of Sn is
FS(t) = Pr(S  t) = lim
n!1
Pr(Sn  t)
i.e., FS(t) measures the probability that the total time that an application spends in the
system is less than or equal to t. Also limn!1 1n
P1
k=1 Sk = E(S) w.p. 1.
We rst reproduce a basic result (See Cooper 1981; Klienrock 1975 for a di¤erent
treatment) that is essential for our study. Note that the exponential service distribution
is memoryless and therefore the random variables Wk are independent of each other 8k.
As Wk  exponential () 8k, E(Wk) =  1 and V ar(Wk) =  2. Also note that
Pr(S > t) = Pr(
X+1
k=1
Wk > t) =
1X
n=0
Pr(
n+1X
k=1
Wk > t) Pr(X = n)
Now
Pn+1
k=1Wk has an Erlang-(n+ 1) distribution. Therefore,
Pr(S > t; t = 0) =
1X
n=0
nX
k=0
(t)k
k!
e t(1  )n
=
1X
k=0
1X
n=k
(t)k
k!
e t(1  )n =
1X
k=0
(t)k
k!
e t = e ( )t
Thus S  exponential (  ) and hence E(S) = (  ) 1 and V ar(S) = (  ) 2.
Let g and G represent the probability density function and cumulative distribution
function respectively. Also let Si be associated with i = f; l. Now the ine¢ ciency of SIS ,
denoted by EWT (SIS ), can be measured as EU where the density of U  maxfSf ; Slg
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is given by
g[U  maxfSf ; Slg]
= g
Sf
(u)GSl(u) + g
Sl
(u)GSf (u)
=
 
f   

e (f )u(1  e (l )u)+ (l   ) e (l )u(1  e (f )u)
=
 
f   

e (f )u+(l   ) e (l )u 
 
f + l   2

e (f+l 2)u
ThereforeEWT (SIS )  EU = 1 
f   
+ 1
(l   )
  1
f + l   2
. The justication
for choosing this max operator has been discussed when we calculated ENA (SIS ) under
ENA. Similarly, EWT (SES ) can be measured asEV where the density of V  (Sf+Sl)
is given by
g[V  Sf + Sl]
=
vZ
0
g
Sf
(v   sl)g
Sl
(sl)dsl
=
 
f   

(s   )
l   f
[e (f )v  e (l )v]
Therefore, EWT (SES )  EV = 1 
f   
 + 1
(l   )
. Calculating the ine¢ ciency
for SWS is straight forward. It can easily be seen that
EWT (SWS ) =
1
[1
2
( 1f + 
 1
l )]
 1   
We are now in a position to compare the ine¢ ciencies as we did under ENA. The
next proposition follows easily from the above discussion.
Proposition 3 If the ine¢ ciency of an approval system is measured by EWT , the policy
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SWS is the most e¢ cient, followed by SIS and SES , i.e., EWT (SWS ) < EWT (SIS ) <
EWT (SES ).
Proof. Note that [1
2
( 1f + 
 1
l )] 5 max( 1f ;  1l ) = [min(f ; l)] 1. Therefore
1
[1
2
( 1f + 
 1
l )]
 1    5
1
min(f ; l)  
(4)
Since both the terms
1
(l   )
  1
f + l   2
and
1 
f   
  1
f + l   2
> 0 we have
1
min(f ; l)  
<
1 
f   
 + 1
(l   )
  1
f + l   2
(5)
Clearly
1 
f   
 + 1
(l   )
  1
f + l   2
<
1 
f   
 + 1
(l   )
(6)
Thus combining the above three inequalities, we have
1
[1
2
( 1f + 
 1
l )]
 1    <
1 
f   
 + 1
(l   )
  1
f + l   2
<
1 
f   
 + 1
(l   )
i.e., EWT (SWS ) < EWT (SIS ) < EWT (SES ).
Thus under the measure EWT too, SWS performs better than the SIS and SES.
We now proceed with presenting the following result which is the corresponding result
of proposition 2 under the measure EWT . Here we denote the ine¢ ciency of SWS
associated with the service rate min by EWT (SWS )
min.
Proposition 4 Under EWT , a SWS policy with service rate min  minff ; lg is
also more e¢ cient than the SIS and SES , i.e., EWT (SWS )min < EWT (SIS ) <
EWT (SES ).
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Proof. Note that EWT (SWS )min =
1
min(f ; l)  
. The rest of the proof follows
directly from the proof of proposition 3.
2.3 Some facts and gures
In this subsection we provide some results regarding the ine¢ ciencies of di¤erent clear-
ance systems at the steady state for di¤erent values of , f and l. The choice of the
values of the parameters is arbitrary, subject to the restrictions required by the stability
conditions. We place each of the gures under ENA and EWT side by side. We have
used MATLAB to generate the gures. For the rst four gures (Figures 1 to 4), we x
f and l at 180 and 200 respectively, and increase  from 40 to 150: Figure 1 shows
that given that the values of f and l are xed, the ine¢ ciency measured under ENA
increases with an increase in the the arrival rate of applications. Figure 2 is the corre-
sponding version for the measure EWT . These results are quite expected. However, it
is interesting to note that the ine¢ ciency gap between the single window and other sys-
tems also increases with , given that values of f and l are xed. Figures 3 and 4 plot
the gap between the ine¢ ciencies of the three systems for ENA and EWT respectively.
We denote JK = ENA(SJS)   ENA(SKS) or JK = EWT (SJS)   EWT (SKS)
whichever is applicable, where J;K = I; E;W . As an example, IW in Figure 3 denotes
the gap between the ine¢ ciencies of the systems SIS and SWS, when ine¢ ciency is
measured by ENA. Similarly, IW in Figure 4 denotes the gap between the ine¢ ciencies
of the systems SIS and SWS, when ine¢ ciency is measured by EWT . We see that
under both ENA and EWT , IW and EW increase with . This result tells us that in
a growing economy, where an increase in economic activity leads to more people apply-
ing for passports, investors applying for approvals for new projects, potential exporters
applying for a license etc, SWS performs increasingly better.
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For the remaining four gures (Figures 5 to 8), we x l and  at 200 and 40
respectively, and increase f from 150 to 1200. We could alternatively x f and 
and vary l. Figure 5 shows how the ine¢ ciency of the clearance systems under ENA
changes as the service rate of FG improves, keeping the arrival rate and service rate of
LG xed. Figure 6 is the corresponding version for the measure EWT . These results
are also quite expected. Figure 7 shows that the both EW and IW decrease as f
increases. Figure 8 shows that after initially decreasing, IW increases after a particular
value of f . The results that gures 7 and 8 depict are quite consistent. The shape of
the curves in the last two gures are not unique in the sense that their shapes vary with
the relative value of f and l as well as . As an example, if we x  and l at 5 and 6
respectively and vary f from 6 to 14, we observe that both IW and EW rst decrease
and then start increasing after a particular value of f under ENA as well as EWT . If
we keep on increasing f to a very large number, keeping l and  constant, we see that
the gap in ine¢ ciencies between SWS and the others converges to a particular value
though unnecessary increment of  does not make much sense in our discussion.
[Figures 1-8 here]
3 The Structure of Single Window
In the previous section we have established that an approval system where there is
a single window with a single server is more e¢ cient than multiple window approval
systems. However, the agency which acts as a single window could place its resources in
front of its queue of applications in many ways. One could have a single window approval
system where there are multiple servers. Note that in our paper the concept of a single
window is slightly di¤erent than that dened by Athreya and Majumdar (2005). Suppose
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the applicant has to submit one combined application to a single agency. However, for
the ease of the applicants the agency has two sets of people (servers) who have the
authority to approve an application. The applicants can form two queues in front of the
two servers. Unlike Athreya and Majumdar (2005), in our paper we treat this type of an
approval process as a SWS: The justication for this is that in spite of there being two
queues, the applications have to gain approval of one agency only. The single window
single server can be regarded as the extreme version of the service provided by a SWS
where the application is one single complex licensethat takes care of everything (see
for e.g. L-M-R 2007), and people with di¤erent expertise come together to form only
one server. Now the question arises whether a single window with a single server is
superior to the other forms of single window. In this section we answer this question in
the a¢ rmative.
Let SWS(k j l) denote a single window system where k and l represent the number
of queues and the number of servers respectively. The three possible structures of the
single window that we consider under the M=M=(:) framework are as follows:
SWS(2 j 2): In this system there are two separate queues each having arrival rate

2
and two separate servers each having service rate of . For simplicity, we assume
that the service rates are same for all the servers of the single window. The arrival
processes of the two queues are assumed to be independent. The service processes of
the two servers are also independent of each other. Furthermore, the arrival process of
applications is independent of the service process for each of the queues.
SWS(1 j 2): In this system, instead of having two, there is only one queue with a
combined arrival rate of application  and two counters each having service rate of .
The arrival process of applications is assumed to be independent of the service process
and the service processes of the two servers are also independent of each other.
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SWS(1 j 1): Under this system there is only one queue with a combined arrival rate
 and only one server with the combined service rate . This can be termed as a single
window single server system. Here too the arrival process of applications is independent
of the service process.
In the following subsection we compare the ine¢ ciencies of SWS(2 j 2), SWS(1 j 2)
and SWS(1 j 1) under the measures ENA and EWT .
3.1 Ine¢ ciency under ENA and EWT
Under ENA, the expected queue size at the steady state for SWS(2 j 2) can be measured
as ENA(SWS(2 j 2)) = 2EX = 2
2  while ENA(SWS(1 j 1)) =   where  =  .
These two results can be easily arrived at from the discussion under section 2 where
each and every queue is a simple M=M=1 process. SWS(1 j 2) is a M=M=2 system and
it can be seen that ENA(SWS(1 j 2)) = EX = 4
4 2 (See Gross and Harris 1985, pp
88; Durrett 1999, pp 179).
Note that EWT (SWS(2 j 2)) = 2
(2 ) as the length of each of the queues is

(2 )
while the arrival rate is 
2
. It is straight forward to show that EWT (SWS(1 j 2)) =
4
(4 2) and EWT (SWS(1 j 1)) = ( ) . Hence we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 There exists a c such that if  > c, under both the measures ENA
and EWT , SWS(1 j 1) is the most e¢ cient, followed by SWS(1 j 2) and (SWS(2 j 2)).
Proof. Note that for stability we require  > . Also note that ENA(SWS(1 j
2)) < ENA(SWS(2 j 2)) and EWT (SWS(1 j 2)) < EWT (SWS(2 j 2)) hold. Clearly
ENA(SWS(1 j 1)) < ENA(SWS(1 j 2)) and EWT (SWS(1 j 1)) < EWT (SWS(1 j
2)) hold when  > 1 +    (
2
)2  c. Note that the stability condition is also satised
as 1 +   (
2
)2 > . Hence proved.
23
It can easily be seen that if the service rate of SWS(1 j 1) is 2 (i.e.,  = 2),
proposition 5 clearly holds. Note that a single window with a single server of service
rate 2 always has departures at a rate 2 whereas two servers each having service rate
 sometimes has a departure rate less than 2. Though nding out an exact rate of
service of the combined labor force under SWS(1 j 1) is under the area of empirical
investigation, feasibility of having a SWS(1 j 1) with a service rate of 2 cannot be
a question. For example, suppose the processing time of an application by a set of
employees under the SWS(1 j 1) is exponentially distributed with a mean time say one
month i.e., the service rate of application is one per month. It is reasonable to argue
that two identical sets of employees working under a single umbrella will be able to serve
an application in half of a month, i.e., jointly they can serve two applications per month,
even if there is no additional gain from having two identical groups work together. In
fact we do not even need a service rate of 2 for the combined server all the time. Note
that the threshold value of , c is an increasing function of  and when  ! 0, the
required combined rate of service is simply greater than . Thus, the threshold value of
 can well be achieved.
We now extend our analysis in a more general setup, namely M=G=(:), i.e., the
Poisson arrival and the service processes follow general distribution. We show that it is
possible to compare the above three ine¢ ciencies in the general setup too. The same
framework has been considered by Athreya and Majumdar (2005). We could consider
an even more general framework GI=G=(:), i.e., instead of Poisson arrival, it is a general
input arrival process. However, this framework with many approximation results impose
unnecessary restrictions on our analysis.
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3.2 A more general framework
Here we consider a M=G=(:) framework. Let Xn be the number of applications in a
queue at the moment just after the approval of application n nishes. With Poisson
arrivals with rate  and the service times are i.i.d. with distribution G, fXng1n=0 is a
Markov Chain with the state space J = f0; 1; 2; :::g that satises
Xn+1 =
8><>: Xn   1 + "n+1 if Xn = 1"n+1 if Xn = 0
where f"ngn>1 are i.i.d. random variables with "n represents the number of arrivals
during nth customers service time. The rst order transition probabilities of fXng are
given by p0j = p1j = pj =
1R
0
(t)j[ exp( t)
j!
]dG(t), j > 0. For i > 1, pij = pj i+1.
It can be shown that there is a unique steady state distribution fjg and Xn con-
verges in distribution to a random variable X where Pr(X = j) = j. In the steady
state, one can show that EX = 
2E(S0)2
2(1 ) +  provided E(S
0)2 < 1 where S 0 is the
random variable that represents the service time of the system with distribution G
and  = ES 0. On the other hand we are not aware of any particular result for the
expected queue length and the expected waiting time for a M=G=k system. There
are few approximations available for a M=G=k system. We use the approximation of
mean waiting time in the queue, EWq, due to Nozaki and Ross (1978). On the ac-
curacy of using the approximation by Nozaki and Ross, we argue that it is consistent
with the Kingmans (Kingman 1970) lower and upper bound on Wq for GI=G=k when
adapted to M=G=k. Thus by Littles law, the expected queue length at the stochas-
tic steady state is EX = ( 
kE(S 0)2(ES 0)k 1
2(k   1)!(k   ES)2(Pk 1n=0 (ES)nn! + (ES)k(k 1)!(k ES)) + ES 0),
E(S 0)2 < 1. Using the approximation by Nozaki and Ross for k = 2, we have
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EX = ( 
2E(S 0)2ES 0
2(2  ES 0)2(1 + ES 0 + (ES0)2
(2 ES0))
+ ES 0).
Here SWS(2 j 2) consists of two M=G=1 queues with each queue having the char-
acteristics (
2
; S 0; 1
ES0 ). That is, in SWS(2 j 2), the arrival rate is 2 for each of the
two queues and the mean service time is ES 0 for each of the two servers. The second
system namely SWS(1 j 2) is a M=G=2 queue which has the characteristics (; S 0; 1
ES0 ).
That is, under SWS(1 j 2), there is only one queue with a combined arrival rate of 
but there are two servers each having the expected service time ES 0. The third system
SWS(1 j 1) is a M=G=1 characterized by (; S; 1
ES
) and represents the single window
single server system. In SWS(1 j 1), there is only one queue simply like the SWS(1 j 2)
system with a combined arrival rate of  and there is only one server with a combined
service rate of 1
ES
, that is, we assume that the expected service time of this SWS(1 j 1)
system is ES. By construction, the three systems described above satisfy our notion of
single window.
3.2.1 Ine¢ ciency under ENA and EWT
We start with the measure ENA. We know that
ENA(SWS(2 j 2)) = 2EX = 
2E(S 0)2
2(2  ES 0) + ES
0
We also have
ENA(SWS(1 j 2)) = EX = ( 
2E(S 0)2ES 0
2(2  ES 0)2(1 + ES 0 + (ES0)2
(2 ES0))
+ ES 0)
and
ENA(SWS(1 j 1)) = 
2E(S)2
2(1  ES) + ES
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Let us assume that S 0 has the same rst two moments as 0S where 0  
0 .
Proposition 6 Under ENA, 9  3 80 2 [; 2
ES
), ENA(SWS(1 j 1)) < ENA(SWS(1 j
2)) < ENA(SWS(2 j 2)) holds.
Proof. Note that
ENA(SWS(2 j 2))
ENA(SWS(1 j 2))  (
0) =
2E(S 0)2
2(2  ES 0) + ES
0
(
2E(S 0)2ES 0
2(2  ES 0)2(1 + ES 0 + (ES0)2
(2 ES0))
+ ES 0)
=
E(S 0)2
2(2  ES 0) + ES
0
2E(S 0)2ES 0
2(2  ES 0)(2 + ES 0) + ES
0
Hence to show that (0) > 1, it is su¢ cient to show that
E(S 0)2
2(2  ES 0)
2E(S 0)2ES 0
2(2  ES 0)(2 + ES 0)
> 1.
Note that
E(S 0)2
2(2  ES 0)
2E(S 0)2ES 0
2(2  ES 0)(2 + ES 0)
> 1 ) 2+ES0
ES0 = 1 +
2
ES0 > 1. Obviously, the
inequality is always true. Now we compare ENA(SWS(1 j 2)) and ENA(SWS(1 j 1)).
We have
ENA(SWS(1 j 1))
ENA(SWS(1 j 2))  '(
0) =
2E(S)2
2(1  ES) + ES
(
2E(S 0)2ES 0
2(2  ES 0)2(1 + ES 0 + (ES0)2
(2 ES0))
+ ES 0)
=
2E(S)2
2(1  ES) + ES
(
032E(S)2ES
2(2  0ES)(2 + 0ES 0) + 
0ES)
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Note that for stability we require ES 0 < 2) 0ES < 2) 0 < 2
ES
. We also observe
that '(0) is monotonically decreasing, with lim0!0 '(
0) =1 and lim0! 2
ES
'(0) = 0.
Therefore, 9  3 '(0) < 1 80 2 [; 2
ES
). Given (0) > 1, the last result is enough
to prove our proposition. However we will discuss all the three single window systems
separately, specify the domain of 0 for each of the comparisons where the desired result
holds and draw the conclusion thereafter. Thus we compare ENA(SWS(2 j 2)) and
ENA(SWS(1 j 1)) in a similar way. We observe that
ENA(SWS(1 j 1))
ENA(SWS(2 j 2))  (
0) =
2E(S)2
2(1  ES) + ES
2E(S 0)2
2(2  ES 0) + ES
0
=
2E(S)2
2(1  ES) + ES
022E(S)2
2(2  0ES) + 
0ES
Here, for stability we require 
2
ES 0 < 1 ) 0ES < 2 ) 0 < 2
ES
and hence the same
restriction on 0 works for both '(0) and (0). Clearly (0) is also monotonically
decreasing, with lim0!0 (
0) = 1 and lim0! 2
ES
(0) = 0. Therefore, 9 e 3 (e) < 1
80 2 [e; 2
ES
). Now we combine the above three comparisons of ine¢ ciencies together
to prove our proposition. Given that (0) > 1 holds, we must have (0) < '(0)
80 2 [0; 2
ES
). Therefore, (0) j0=<< 1, i.e., e < . Also note that  > 1. Thus,
ENA(SWS(1 j 1)) < ENA(SWS(1 j 2)) < ENA(SWS(2 j 2)) holds for 0 2 [e; 2
ES
)\
[; 2
ES
) = [; 2
ES
).
The values of E(S)2 and E(S 0)2 also play a crucial role here. Note that V ar(S 0) =
E(S 0)2   [E(S 0)]2 = 02 V ar(S) ) 02 = E(S0)2
E(S)2
= V ar(S
0)
V ar(S)
. As '0(0) < 0, the value of 0
reaches  fast if V ar(S
0)
V ar(S)
is high. To be more elaborate, instead of assuming that S 0 and 0S
28
have the same rst two moments, if we assume that only the rst moment is the same,
we can check that if we set a particular value for , a high E(S)2 compared to E(S 0)2
may result in ENA(SWS(1j1))
ENA(SWS(1j2)) > 1. If we keep on lowering the value of E(S)
2, we arrive at
a point after which ENA(SWS(1j1))
ENA(SWS(1j2)) < 1 holds. Thus higher the variance of SWS(1 j 1),
higher is the combined rate of service required for SWS(1 j 1) to have ENA(SWS(1j1))
ENA(SWS(1j2)) < 1.
Hence in this general case, for a given , a SWS(1 j 1) may perform better only when
the second order moment of the service time is not very high compared to the other
SWS systems. So unlike the comparisons in the M=M=(:) framework of section 3:1,
we cannot draw an unambiguous comparison on the entire domain of 0 independent
of the value of E(S)2 and E(S 0)2. The required relationship between the second order
moments of the two systems can be derived from the inequality itself. However it does
not seem much reasonable that when the labor force is combined to form a SWS(1 j 1)
system, it should have a very high second moment.
It can easily be shown that under the measure EWT , the same relationship holds in
the above specied domain of 0. The total waiting time of an application in the system
is given by EW = EWq + ES. Thus EWT (SWS(2 j 2)) = E(S
0)2
(2  ES 0) + ES
0,
EWT (SWS(1 j 2)) = EWq + ES = 
2E(S 0)2ES 0
2(2  ES 0)2(1 + ES 0 + (ES0)2
(2 ES0))
+ ES 0
whereas EWT (SWS(1 j 1)) = E(S)
2
2(1  ES) + ES.
Proposition 7 Under EWT , 9  3 80 2 [; 2
ES
), EWT (SWS(1 j 1)) < EWT (SWS(1 j
2)) < EWT (SWS(2 j 2)) holds.
Proof. Note that under EWT ,
EWT (SWS(2 j 2))
EWT (SWS(1 j 2))  (
0) = 2(1+ 2
ES0 ) = 2(
0) and
hence (0) > 1. It easily follows from the above that
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EWT (SWS(1 j 1))
EWT (SWS(1 j 2))  (
0) =
E(S)2
2(1  ES) + ES
2E(S 0)2ES 0
2(2  ES 0)2(1 + ES 0 + (ES0)2
(2 ES0))
+ ES 0
= '(0) and
EWT (SWS(1 j 1))
EWT (SWS(2 j 2))   (
0) =
E(S)2
2(1  ES) + ES
E(S 0)2
2(2  ES 0) + ES
0
=
(0)
2
Clearly for stability the same restriction 0 < 2
ES
is required here . Also note that
if 0 2 [; 2
ES
), (0) < 1 holds. But  (0) < 1 for 0 2 [b; 2
ES
) where b < e.
Therefore EWT (SWS(1 j 1)) < EWT (SWS(1 j 2)) < EWT (SWS(2 j 2)) when
0 2 [b; 2
ES
) \ [; 2
ES
) = [; 2
ES
). Note that ENA(SWS(1 j 1)) < ENA(SWS(1 j
2)) < ENA(SWS(2 j 2)) holds for the same domain of 0. Hence the proof.
We can have the same discussion about the role of second order moment of S and S 0
for the measure EWT .
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the single window approval system is the most e¢ cient
among the other prevailing clearance systems. We have also established that a re-
organization of labor force towards making it a single window system can be e¤ected
without a change in government employment. Furthermore, we shed some light on the
extreme version of the single window policy and show that a single window single server
approval process can be more e¢ cient than a single window with many servers.
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CHAPTER 3. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN EDUCATION IN
THE PRESENCE OF CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES
1 Introduction
Governments around the world routinely intervene in the arena of education, and at
all levels. While government involvement in primary and secondary education is almost
universal, its presence in higher education (especially, in the form of education loans and
subsidies) is also fairly common. Heckman (2000), for example, estimates that around
80% of the direct cost at major public universities in the United States is subsidized. The
standard rationale for such intervention is the alleged external benets from education:
existing graduates [will have] more graduates to talk to [Layard, 1980]. In other
words, if there are spillovers from education, then the argument is that those producing
it should not bear the full cost of it (for if they were forced to, they would undereducate
themselves). Such a human-capital-externality argument features prominently in some
of the most inuential work in growth theory (such as Lucas, 1988) from the last three
decades. From a policy-making perspective, the human capital externality and its size is
important because it determines the extent to which education and job training should
be subsidized (Heckman and Klenow, 1998 and Heckman, 2000).
Yet, the empirical backing for such an externality is not as strong as one would
think. Studies involving the estimation of a Mincerian wage equation using micro-level
U.S. data, show that the private return to schooling ranges from 4% to 16%, with a
consensus estimate around 10% (for a survey, see Card, 1999). Using U.S. state-level
data to estimate a Mincerian wage equation, Yamarik (2008) nds that the social return
to U.S. schooling is of the order of 9-16%. Turner et. al. (2007) have also used a Mincer
model on aggregate-level data and estimated the social return to education in the U.S.
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to be 12%-15%. It is the closeness of the estimates of the social return to the private
return which suggests that U.S. schooling generates little external return.1 These sorts of
observations help motivate a fairly broad question: how can economists rationalize such
ubiquity and importance of government intervention in education when direct spillovers
of education are supposedly mild?2
In this paper, I narrow the focus of this question, somewhat, by raising it within
the context of a neoclassical overlapping generations (OG) model in which no intra
and intergenerational human capital externalities are present and capital markets are
perfect. I argue that externalities in consumption3 may help make the case for pub-
lic involvement in education, even in this case. Specically, I allow for the possibility
of intra and intergenerational consumption externalities; an agent faces a consumption
oor determined by every other agent alive at that point in her life cycle. This is a
natural extension of the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses phenomenon in that living genera-
tions compare their consumption to both their own and that of other generations alive.
Since agentssaving behavior get a¤ected if they are preoccupied with keeping up, the
allocation of resources to production of human capital in the competitive economy may
not be optimal.
The model economy is similar in many respects to the one studied in Boldrin and
Montes (2005) and Docquier et al (2007). Agents live for three periods in a OG economy.
In the rst period of their lives (i.e., when they are young), they do not consume but
borrow from a perfect credit market and invest in their human capital. When middle
1For more on the external return to education, see Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), Rudd (2000),
Ciccone and Peri (2006), and Lange and Topel (2006).
2Other popular justications for strong government involvement in education include the following:
a) credit market imperfections: see Becker (1975), Schultz (1961) and Kodde and Ritzen (1985); b)
production of social capital (see Putnam et. al. (1993), Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004)); c) creating a
civic society of knowledgeable voters (for e.g., Dee, (2004)).
3The idea of a consumption externality has long been studied and documented, and involves the
notion that people care not just about their own absolute level of consumption but also about how
it compares to those around them. Models with interdependent preferences have become immensely
popular in many areas of economics and nance. For a recent review, see Abel (2005), Alonso-Carrera
et. al (2008), Barnett and Bhattacharya, (2008), among others.
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aged, they supply their labor inelastically, produce the nal good, repay the education
loan, and save in the form of physical capital. When old, they retire and consume the
return on their saving. Utility is derived not from the absolute level of consumption
but from the di¤erence between the absolute and a reference level of consumption. The
reference level of consumption at every time point is an weighted arithmetic average of
per capita consumption of the two living generations. A middle-aged agent compares her
consumption to that up her peers and also to the consumption of her parentsgeneration.
Similarly, an agent when old, keeps up with the consumption of her own peers and the
consumption of the middle-aged generation.
I work out the conditions under which the market economy would over or under ac-
cumulate human capital relative to what a benevolent social planner would have deemed
correct. There is a technical novelty that deserves mention. While the rst-order opti-
mality conditions for the competitive market solution involve the same agent over the
two periods of his life, the optimality conditions for the planner involve two di¤erent
agents (an old and a young agent) alive at the same date. If one focused only on steady
states, this would not pose any problems. However, since I solve a innite, dynamic-
planning problem with declining weights on generations to come, I have to nd a way to
make the market and the planning solutions directly comparable if I am to compare the
allocations. I do that by devising the notion of a laissez-faire supportedsocial weight;
by construction, at this specic planning discount rate, the market and planning opti-
mality conditions coincide. However, in the presence of externality in the economy, the
market solutions and planning allocations at this laissez-faire supportedsocial weight
may di¤er. I begin the discussion by studying the e¤ect of consumption externality at
the laissez-faire supportedsocial weight, since at this particular social weight, if there
is no externality in the economy, planners optimality conditions as well as the allocations
coincide with the laissez-faire. The comparisons then proceed by contrasting competi-
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tive allocations with those preferred by utilitarian planners with discount rates di¤erent
from this weight.
The presence of the consumption externalities ensures that the decentralized market
arrangement is typically not Pareto e¢ cient. In fact, the competitive solution (assuming
all markets are competitive) deviates from that of the utilitarian social plannersfavored
allocation in two dimensions: the market economy may over or under accumulate both
physical and human capital. From Diamond (1965), it is well known that a competitive
economy may overaccumulate physical capital if the real return to capital is too low
(below unity in a model sans population growth). In contrast, I nd that both over and
under accumulation of physical capital is possible even the real return to capital is too
low. What is additionally quite striking is the fact that agents in the market economy
may accumulate more human capital than what the di¤erent planners (the di¤erence
being based on how they discount the utility of the future generations) would have liked.
When will the market economy accumulate less human (and physical) capital than
the planner? I show that answers to these sorts of questions depend on the specic
nature of the consumption externality. For an example, if the consumption benchmark
in society is largely inuenced by the working population (the middle-aged), then un-
deraccumulation is likely. Heuristically, this is a setting in which the Joneses are young
and in trying to keep up with them, everyone wishes to consume more. The middle-aged
achieve this by cutting down on saving. In a perfect-foresight equilibrium, this is con-
sistent with a high return to capital and a low wage rate. Since the young borrow (at
this high interest rate and in an environment of anticipated low wage rate) to fund their
education, they per force borrow less and accumulate less human capital. A justication
for public involvement in education is thereby created. While the informal argument
presented above is useful for insight building, it deserves mention here that the exact
discount rate used by the planner is also of critical importance  if, for example, the
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weight on future generations is high, the planner would set aside a lot of capital for
future production.
From a modeling perspective, the paper closest to mine is Docquier et. al. (2007).
The critical di¤erence is that they assume the presence of a intergenerational human cap-
ital externality (which generates endogenous growth) but no consumption externality is
present. The papers also di¤er in the way the two sets of solutions (one for competitive
equilibrium and the other for the planners solutions) are compared and the reference
level of the planners weight is dened (see section 3). Furthermore, they compare the
levels of physical and human capital in a laissez-faire economy to that in the planners
solution. They nd that in the presence of the human capital externality, the social
weight assigned by the planner to future generations decides whether there is overac-
cumulation or underaccumulation of capital (both human and physical). In particular,
when that weight is low (high) enough, the market always overaccumulates (underac-
cumulates). This characterization is no longer true in the present analysis. The exact
nature of the consumption externality becomes crucial in determining the possibility
of over and underaccumulation. There is an obvious implication of the Docquier et.
al. (2007) result: if the planning weight on future generations is relatively high, the
market underaccumulates and by implication, the case for public pensions is weakened.
My results suggest that the case for public pensions may still be strong if consumption
externalities of a certain kind are present.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Under section 2, I present the ba-
sic framework of the economy in subsection 2.1 and subsequently in subsection 2.2, I
present the competitive set up while in subsection 2.3, a competitive equilibrium has
been described. Planners rst best solutions in the presence of consumption externality
have been characterized in subsection 2.4. In section 3, I present the main results of
this paper. I work out the results using particular functional forms of a representative
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economy and present the numerical result in section 4. While section 5 concludes, the
Appendix A contains the proofs of all the lemmas and propositions.
2 The Model
2.1 Primitives
I consider an economy consisting of an innite sequence of three-period lived overlapping
generations, an initial old generation, and an innitely-lived government. In the rst
period of life (i.e., when they are young), agents borrow to invest in their education.
They work and pay o¤ their loans in the second period, and retire in the third period.
Let t = 1; 2; ::: index time. The generation that works during period t is indexed by
t. The population size of generation t is denoted by Nt: At any date t; the population
consists of old, middle-aged, and young agents the population size in period t is given
by Nt 1 +Nt +Nt+1. The population is assumed to grow at a gross rate of N or a net
rate n i.e., N = 1+n. The initial middle-aged agents are endowed with K1 > 0 units of
physical capital.
There is a single nal good and it can either be consumed in the period it is produced,
or it can be stored to yield capital the following period. Let Kt and Ht denote the
aggregate levels of physical and human capital at date t respectively, and ht  Ht=Nt:
The aggregate production function is given by Yt = F (Kt; Ht) where F is assumed to
be homogeneous of degree 1. This assumption allows us to write Yt = Htf(kt), where,
kt  ktht and kt = KtNt . The function f is assumed to be positive, strictly increasing and
strictly concave in its argument, i.e., f > 0, f 0 > 0 and f 00 < 0. For reasons of analytical
tractability, capital is assumed to depreciate 100% between periods.
An agent belonging to generation t borrows an amount et 1 from a perfect capital
market and invests in education in period t   1: The education they acquire in t   1
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translates into human capital in period t as described by
ht = (et 1); (1)
where  () is a strictly increasing and a strictly concave function that satises the Inada
conditions, i.e., 0() > 0, 00() < 0 with 0(0) = 1, 0(1) = 0. As already discussed
in the introduction, the construction of ht in this paper ensures that the production of
human capital is free from the e¤ect of any kind of externality.
I now shed some light on the structure of human capital formation technology. In
endogenous growth models like those used by Boldrin and Montes (2005), Docquier et
al (2007) and others, the source of endogenous growth lies in the formulation of the
human capital production function. In each period, human capital is generated using
the human capital accumulated by their previous generation along with the amount the
agent borrows from a perfect capital market. This specication ensures that there is an
externality in the production of human capital since agents are born with some amount of
human capital. Zhang (2003) has constructed a growth model where the human capital
production function also includes the average human capital present in the economy. In
this paper, I drop both the assumptions that per capita human capital production is
a¤ected by the average level of human capital and also that agents are born with some
human capital. Thus I construct a human capital production function which is free from
any type externality. Galor and Moav (2006) have also worked with a similar production
function, albeit in a di¤erent context, where human capital production depends only on
the amount of government subsidy available. I provide a perfect capital market to
guarantee that any deviation from optimal human capital production is not due to the
inexistence of a perfect source of borrowings.
Preferences of agents play an important role in the ensuing analysis. For simplicity, I
assume the young at any date do not consume. Let ct denote the middle-age consumption
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of a generation-t individual and let dt+1 denote her old-age consumption. I assume
that an agents utility depends upon her level of consumption when compared to a
reference standard her e¤ective level of consumption. More precisely, lifetime utility
of a generation-t agent is given by
ut = u
bct; bdt+1
where bct and bdt+1 denote her e¤ective level of consumption when middle aged and old
respectively. This utility function is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satises
Inada conditions for both of its arguments. Following Alonso - Carrera et al. (2008) the
e¤ective levels of consumption of a generation-t agent is given by
bct = ct   vmt ;
and bdt+1 = dt+1   vot+1;
where  2 [0; 1) and  2 [0; 1) measure the intensity of the consumption references,
vmt and v
o
t+1; respectively. The consumption benchmarks in any period are assumed to
be a weighted arithmetic average of the per-capita consumption of the two generations
consuming in that period. Specically,
vmt 
Ntct + 
mNt 1dt
Nt + 
mNt 1
=

N
N + m

ct +

m
N + m

dt;
where m 2 [0; 1] is the weight of a representative old agents consumption in the speci-
cation of the middle-aged agents consumption benchmark. Similarly
vot+1 
oNt+1ct+1 +Ntdt+1
oNt+1 +Nt
=

oN
oN + 1

ct+1 +

1
oN + 1

dt+1;
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where o 2 [0; 1] is the weight of a representative middle-aged agents consumption in
the specication of an old agents consumption reference. Denoting N
N+m
 "m and
oN
oN+1
 "o gives vmt = "mct + (1  "m)dt and vot+1  "oct+1 + (1  "o)dt+1.
The above formulation of preferences allow for both intragenerational consumption
externality and also intergenerational consumption spillovers that is the possibility of a
generation other than ones own to inuence ones consumption decision. The strength of
these inuences depend on the deeper parameters m and o:Versions of these preferences
have been used by Abel (2005).4 It is worthwhile to note here that while "m ((1  "o))
represents the degree to which a middle aged (old) agent keeps up with the others in her
own generation, (1  "m) and "o represents the degree to which the agent keeps up with
the other generation. Barnett and Bhattacharya (2008) associate "o > 0 with rejuvenile
behavior, the old trying to keep up with their children. We now introduce some notions
of externality based on the values of "m and "o. When both "m and "o are high, the
weight that is given to the level of consumption of the middle aged (the working class)
in the construction of the consumption reference is high, I call it a middle aged driven
externality [EM ]. Similarly, when both "m and "o are low, it is called an old driven
externality [EO]. The case where "m is high but "o is low represents an economy where
an agents consumption externality is driven by her contemporary generation [ECG].
That is, the consumption externality of a middle aged agent is driven by the middle aged
population whereas the the consumption externality of an old agent is driven by the old
population. The condition when "o is high but "m is low represents an economy where
an agents consumption externality is driven by the other consuming generation [EOG],
i.e., the consumption externality of a middle aged agent is driven by the old population
4The form of externality used in this paper di¤ers from the one used in Abel (2005). In Abel (2005)
the reference consumption is of a multiplicative form and depends on the levels of consumption of two
di¤erent generations at a particular time point. Furthermore the reference consumption level a¤ects
the utility of an agents consumption multiplicatively. Here the reference consumption level has been
constructed additively and unlike Abel (2005) e¤ective consumption is determined by subtracting the
reference consumption level from the actuals.
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whereas the the consumption externality of an old agent is driven by the middle aged
population. More specically, I assume that highmeans when the coe¢ cients exceed
the number 1
2
. Now I start with a competitive set up and then dene the competitive
equilibrium in this economy.
2.2 Trade
Middle-aged agents supply their human capital inelastically in competitive labor mar-
kets, earning a wage rate, wt, at time t, where
wt  w(kt) = f(kt)  ktf 0(kt) (2)
and w0(kt) > 0. In addition, capital is traded in competitive capital markets, and earns
a gross real return of Rt+1 between t and t+ 1, where
Rt+1  R
 
kt+1

= f 0(kt+1) (3)
with R0
 
kt+1

< 0 8t by the property of function f .
Parents in this economy are selsh and do not care for the education of their children.
A generation-t agent borrows amount et 1 in period t   1 at the gross interest rate Rt
(also see Boldrin and Montes (2005), Docquier et al (2007)). Agent pays o¤ this loan
with income earned during period t. The income Wt of a middle-aged agent in period
t is given by Wt  wtht   Rtet 1. A generation-t agents optimization problem can be
written as:
max
st;et 1
u
bct; bdt+1
subject to
ct = Wt   st;
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dt+1 = Rt+1st;
and
ct  vmt ; dt+1  vot+1; st  0
where st denotes saving. Note that in a competitive set up, agents take vmt and v
o
t+1 as
parametrically given.
Assuming interior solutions and using (1), the solution to a generation-t agents
problem is characterized by the following optimality conditions
st : ubct = ubdt+1Rt+1 ) ubctubdt+1 = Rt+1 (4)
and
et 1 : wt 
0(et 1) = Rt ) 0(et 1) = Rt
wt
: (5)
Note that st > 0 ) Wt > 0. The rst optimality condition is straight forward which
simply describes the optimum intertemporal consumption-saving decision of the agent.
The second condition which represents the optimum expenditure towards education can
also be looked at from another angle. The equation also guarantees that indeed the
optimality is reached where there is no incentive of agents by increasing her education
marginally, that is, where @Wt
@et 1
= wt 
0(et 1)   Rt = 0 occurs. It can be seen that this
equation is not directly a¤ected by any externality in the consumption issue.
2.3 Competitive Equilibrium (CE)
Before I formally dene the competitive equilibrium, I introduce the market clearing
condition for this economy. While a part of the collective savings of the middle aged is
used to nance education for the young, the remaining amount becomes capital stock
for the next period. Hence the market clearing condition can be written as Ntst =
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Kt+1 +Nt+1et; which means
st = kt+1(1 + n)ht+1 + (1 + n)et: (6)
I formally dene competitive equilibrium below.
Denition 1 Given k1 and h1, a competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence
of consumption allocations fct; dtg1t=1, allocations of saving, capital, and education ex-
penses, fst; kt; et 1g1t=1, and factor prices fwt;Rtg1t=1 that solve the agentsoptimization
problem at each date, satisfy the market-clearing conditions, and the factor prices satisfy
(2)-(3).
Henceforth, I denote with superscript CE the competitive equilibrium outcomes.
Using (2)-(3), I can rewrite (4)-(5) as
uCEbct
uCEbdt+1
= f 0

k
CE
t+1

; (7)
and
0(eCEt ) =
f 0

k
CE
t+1

f

k
CE
t+1

  kCEt+1 f 0

k
CE
t+1
 ; (8)
which, in turn, implies
eCEt 1 = (
0) 1
 
R(k
CE
t )
w(k
CE
t )
!
: (9)
The income Wt can be re-written as
Wt = wtht  Rtet 1 = wt(et 1)  wt0(et 1)et 1 (10)
= wt(et 1(kt))[1  ] = wt(kt)(et 1(kt))[1  (kt)];
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where  is the elasticity of  with respect to e. Per capita saving at t by the working
middle-aged is given by
st = Wt   ct = st(Wt; dt) = st(wt(kt)(et 1(kt))[1  (kt)]; Rt(kt)st 1): (11)
In order to make the calculations needed to nd (12) manageable, I assume that  = 0,
i.e., the consumption of an old agent is not a¤ected by any kind of externality.5 Using
equations (11) and (6) I get the equilibrium law of motion for the physical-to-human-
capital ratio for the economy:
st(wt(kt)(et 1(kt))[1  (kt)]; Rt(kt)[kt(1 + n)(et 1(kt)) + (1 + n)et 1(kt)]) (12)
= kt+1(1 + n)(et(kt+1)) + (1 + n)et(kt+1)
All competitive equilibrium sequences fktg and fhtg must satisfy (12).
A steady state equilibrium is a time-invariant sequence of ct, dt, st and et. In par-
ticular, in a steady state, a time invariant k
CE
satises (12).
2.4 Social Planners (SP) Solution
I now proceed to solve the planners problem. The planner takes into account the cross-
generational consumption externalities ignored by individual agents. It is easy to verify
that the resource constraint for the planner can be written as:
htf(kt) = ct +
dt
1 + n
+ (1 + n)(et + kt+1). (13)
The planner maximizes the sum of lifetime utilities of all the generations over the
innite horizon subject to the above resource constraint. I assume that generational
5However, no such restriction has been imposed on  while presenting the main result. This assump-
tion has been made only when nding the law of motion of physical-to-human capital ratio.
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utility is discounted by a factor  2 (0; 1). I refer to  as the social weight that the
planner attaches to the future generations. A higher  implies that the social discount
rate at which the planner devaluates the future generations is low. In the ensuing
analysis, I will interpret di¤erent planners as each being indexed by their own : The
Lagrangian for a generic planners problem is as follows:
$ 
1X
t=0
t

u(bct; bdt+1) + qt[htf(kt)  ct   dt
1 + n
  (1 + n)(et + kt+1)] + pt[(et)  ht+1]

where tqt and 
tpt are the multipliers associated with the resource constraint of the
economy and human capital formation technology respectively, at date t.
The rst order conditions with respect to cSPt , d
SP
t , e
SP
t , k
SP
t+1 and h
SP
t+1 are given
below where the superscript SP denotes the planners outcome:
cSPt : 
tuSPbct (1  "m)  t 1uSPbdt "o   tqt = 0 (14)
dSPt :  tuSPbct (1  "m) + t 1uSPbdt (1  (1  "o))  t qt1 + n = 0 (15)
eSPt :  t(1 + n)qt + tpt0(eSPt ) = 0 (16)
kSPt+1 : 
t+1qt+1h
SP
t+1f
0(k
SP
t+1)
1
hSPt+1
  tqt(1 + n) = 0 (17)
) qt(1 + n) = qt+1f 0(kSPt+1)
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hSPt+1 : 
t+1qt+1[h
SP
t+1f
0(k
SP
t+1)( 
kSPt+1
(hSPt+1)
2
) + f(k
SP
t+1)]  tpt = 0 (18)
) t+1qt+1[f(kSPt+1)  f 0(k
SP
t+1)k
SP
t+1]  tpt = 0.
From equations (16), (17) and (18), I have
0(eSPt ) =
f 0(k
SP
t+1)
f(k
SP
t+1)  f 0(k
SP
t+1)k
SP
t+1
: (19)
Dene the externality factor
  "
o + (1  (1  "o))(1 + n)
(1  "m) + (1  "m)(1 + n) : (20)
Then, from equations (14) and (15) I have
uSPbct
uSPbdt
=
1

; (21)
and using equations (14), (15) and (17); I can derive the following intertemporal rela-
tionship6:
uSPbct
uSPbdt+1
= f 0(k
SP
t+1)

1 + n
: (22)
Combining above two equations, I get
uSPbdt+1
uSPbdt
=
1
f 0(k
SP
t+1)
(1 + n): (23)
Note that at a steady state,
f 0(k
SP
) =
1

(1 + n) (24)
6Algebraic calculations are shown in the supplementary materials.
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holds which denes modied golden rule in this model. It is easy to verify that  and
k
SP
are positively related, which in turn implies that if a planner gives more weight to
future generations, there will be an increase in the steady state requirement of golden
rule k
SP
.
3 Comparisons
In this section I compare a steady state of the competitive equilibrium with the planners
solution in terms of both physical and human capital. In order to be able to compare,
I establish a common point around which this discussion will be meaningful. However,
before I can do that, I will need to establish a few more results. All the proofs are given
in the appendix.
First, it can be easily veried that
@k
i
t
@eit 1
> 0, i = CE; SP . Naturally the result also
holds in a steady state. If I denote the elasticity of kt with respect to et 1 as , then it
is easy to check that for every k, h, e and t,  >  holds, i.e., whenever the investment
in education changes, the proportionate change in per capita physical capital dominates
the proportionate change in human capital. This result is obtained by nding out the
e¤ect of social weight  on the steady state values of k
SP
and eSP . It can be veried that
both k
SP
and eSP increase as the social weight increases. Thus a planner who attaches
a higher social weight to future generations guarantees a higher expenditure towards
education. Since  >  holds, an increase in social weight not only increases optimal per
capita physical and human capital production but also the ratio of per capita physical
to human capital. Thus, I have
Lemma 2 At a steady state dk
SP
d
> 0 and de
SP
d
> 0 hold for any . Also,  >  holds
for both CE and SP .
Lemma 2 suggests that if the rate at which the planner discounts the future gener-
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ation increases, expenditure towards education and hence the e¤ective capital stock in
the planners solution will fall at a steady state. For an equivalent result in a growth set
up, see Docquier et al (2007).
In order to establish a common ground where the comparison between the laissez-faire
and planning solutions is meaningful, I assume there exists a  (call it ) such that the
optimality conditions generated by the planners economy associated with this social
weight is identical to that in the competitive economy. I also impose the additional
restriction that k
SP
() 2 (0; (f 0) 1(1 + n)); where kSP () represents kSP associated
with the weight . Note that the values that k
SP
can take, has an upper bound which
is determined by the restriction on . In particular, as  2 (0; 1), from equation (24), I
have k
SP  ! 0 as   ! 0 and on the other hand, kSP  ! (f 0) 1(1 + n) when   ! 1.
Since dk
SP
d
> 0, at the steady state k
SP 2 (0; kSPmax) where k
SP
max = (f
0) 1(1 + n).
At this point I should discuss the di¤erence in the technique used to compare CE
and SP by me with that in Docquier et al.(2007). Apart from the fact that their set
up is di¤erent from ours, in Docquier et al.(2007), the benchmark social weights around
which they have compared the laissez-faire and planning solutions are where the crucial
variables (and hence capital stocks) are identical. That means, in their model there
exist social weights for which the capital stocks in a planners solution equal to that in
a competitive economy. In contrast, in my model, there exists, under some restrictions,
a particular social weight , for which the planners optimality conditions are exactly
identical to that in the CE economy. However, in the absence of any consumption
externality in the economy, planners optimality conditions as well as the allocations
coincide with the laissez-faire one. I term this social weight  a laissez-faire supported
social weight. The existence of such  requires a restriction that k
SP
() 2 (0; kSPmax). I
show if such a  =  exists then it must be unique. Hence the following lemma.
Lemma 3 If there exists a laissez-faire supported social weight ; then it must be unique.
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There is another uniqueness result between k
SP
and eSP which is stated as Lemma
4 below. The lemma follows directly from equations (8) and (19). The result is quite
expected as there is no externality present in the human capital formation function.
Lemma 4 If there exists any  = b so that kSP (b) = kCE holds, then the same b
equates eSP (b) = eCE and vice-versa.
Now I am in a position to state the main result of the paper.
Proposition 5 At a laissez-faire supported social weight, competitive equilibrium un-
derproduces both human and physical capital compared to the planning allocation if the
externality factor is greater than unity, that is, if  > 1 where  is dened in (20). On
the other hand, competitive equilibrium overproduces both types of capital whenever the
externality factor is less than unity, that is, if  < 1.
Thus according to the above proposition, if the social weight is , we have kCE < kSP
and hCE < hSP if  > 1: However, if  < 1, then kCE > kSP and hCE > hSP :
I proceed to provide some intuition for these results. For simplicity, I assume that
n = 0. It is interesting to note that  = 1 in two di¤erent situations, a) when all
externalities are absent, b) when 
+
"o + 
+
"m = 1
2
or 
+
(1  "o) + 
+
(1  "m) = 1
2
,
;  6= 0. This later conguration is termed as balancedexternality.
When externalities are present in both the periods, i.e., when an agents consumption
is a¤ected by externalities when he is both middle aged and old,  ? 1 ) 
+
"o +

+
"m ? 1
2
, 
+
(1   "o)+ 
+
(1   "m) 7 1
2
: If there is no consumption externality
when the agent is middle aged that is  = 0,  ? 1 , "o ? 1
2
: On the other hand,
if there is no consumption externality when an agent is old, that is  = 0, we have
 ? 1 , "m ? 1
2
. Thus  > 1 or  < 1 occurs in many di¤erent situations. Observe
that if an economy is characterized by EM , i.e., the externality in consumption is driven
by the middle aged, we will always have  > 1. This means that in this situation, if
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the planners social weight is ; there will be an underaccumulation of both types of
capital in the competitive equilibrium relative to the planners solution. On the other
hand, when an economy is classied as EO, if the social weight assigned by the planner
is ; competitive equilibrium overproduces both types of capital when compared to a
planners solution . However, ambiguity arises when the economy is characterized by
either ECG or EOG since in both these situations,  can either be less than or greater
than unity.
The obvious question at this stage is how to decentralize the planners solution. Any
policy prescription based on the above results crucially depends on the social weight that
the planner assigns to the future generations. In this model I allow the possibility that a
planners social weight may di¤er from . Because of this change in , various interesting
situations may arise. For an example, if a planners social weight  is smaller than ,
even in an economy characterized by EM , competitive equilibrium may overproduce
both types of capital compared to a planners solution. Similarly, an economy which is
characterized as EO may not necessarily overproduce both physical and human capital
in a laissez-faire environment. It can be shown that if a planner assigns signicant weight
to the future generations, an economy characterized by EO may produce less of both
types of capital. Thus policy prescription for an economy crucially depends on the social
weight that the planner assigns to future generations. A complete characterization of
all possible situations has been presented in the next two propositions.
Proposition 6 Suppose the planners social weight to the future generation  exceeds
the laissez-faire supported social weight . Then competitive equilibrium underproduces
both types of capital compared to the planning allocation if the externality factor is greater
than or equal to unity, that is, if   1. However, if the externality factor is less than
unity, that is, if  < 1, it is not obvious whether there will be underaccumulation or
overaccumulation of capital in the competitive equilibrium relative to a planners solution.
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The above proposition says that, given  >  holds, if   1; then we have hSP () >
hCE and kSP () > kCE: On the other hand if  < 1, the relationship between [hSP ()
and hCE] and [kSP () and kCE] becomes ambiguous.
Proposition 7 Suppose the planners social weight to the future generation  is less
than the laissez-faire supported social weight . Then competitive equilibrium overpro-
duces both types of capital compared to the planning allocation whenever the externality
factor is less than or equal to unity, that is, if   1. However, if the externality factor
is greater than unity, that is, if  > 1, it is not obvious whether there will be under-
accumulation or overaccumulation of capital in the competitive equilibrium relative to a
planners solution.
Thus, given  <  holds, if   1, then hSP () < hCE and kSP () < kCE: However,
if  > 1; the relationship between [hSP () and hCE ] and [kSP () and kCE] becomes
ambiguous.
I interpret the above phenomenon in the following paragraphs. All the di¤erent
types of externalities and their corresponding e¤ects can well be explained by the above
results. I have clearly explained the situations where  T 1 holds.
Notice that when under  = , if I set  = 0, then  > 1 ) "m > 1
2
: That is,
externality is present only when the agent is middle aged. Let me explain why there is
an under accumulation of both the capitals in this scenario at the laissez-faire supported
social weight. In this case since middle aged consumption has a high benchmark reference
level, at a steady state, because of this high consumption, saving falls. This reduction
in saving lowers the production of physical capital as a result of which the ratio of
physical to human capital also falls at a given level of human capital. This fall in the
ratio of physical to human capital makes cost of capital high as well as wage rate low
at a given level of human capital. Thus, a reduction in saving through its e¤ect on the
ratio of physical to human capital makes cost of capital high and the wage rate low at
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a given level of human capital. Furthermore, since this high cost of capital and low
wage rate reduce the incentive for young generation to borrow, this not only reduces the
level of human capital accumulation but also reduces the production of physical capital
even further. Therefore the ratio of physical to human capital ratio falls further since
 >  holds (see Lemma 2). When  = 0,  > 1 ) "o > 1
2
. In this case there is no
benchmark consumption when agents are middle aged. But since an old agents a¢ nity
towards middle aged consumption is high, at the steady state, this increases her middle
aged consumption too. Therefore the saving falls and the retrospective e¤ects can be
observed.
In the case of EM where there is underaccumulation of capital (under  = ),
observe that at a steady state, over-consumption by the middle aged agents leads to
a reduction in savings which in turn by the virtue of the market clearing condition
guarantees less per capita physical capital as well as less human capital production in
the competitive equilibrium. Also, a fall in physical capital increases the cost of capital
and decreases the wage rate. This in turn makes borrowing for human capital production
less attractive. But if the weight assigned by a planner to the future generation is very
low, it inversely a¤ects (see Lemma 2) both physical and human capital production
and thus leads to a lower level of physical and human capital at the social optimum.
Therefore, in this situation where a planners social weight is very low, an EM economy
may overproduce both types of capital in a laissez-faire set up. Similarly, in the case
of EO, equilibrium over-consumption by the old generation (under  = ) leads to
an increase in saving which in turn results in a greater production of both physical
and human capital. But if the social weight is high, optimal capital production in a
planners economy increases (see Lemma 2) which in turn raises the possibility that
the laissez-faire economy underproduces compared to a planners economy. In all other
cases, whether there is an overproduction or underproduction of capital in a competitive
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equilibrium relative to a social optima depends on the degree and type of externality.
Notice that though I had started the discussion by nding out a specic  = . It is
now clear from the results that we are capable of comparing the solutions of CE and SP
for the entire range of the possible values of the social weight. The detail result of all
the three propositions stated above are summarized in the table below.
Social weight Externality factor Relationship between CE and SP
 (1; > 1; < 1) (LF;UA;OA)7
 >  (1; > 1; < 1) (UA;UA;AM)
 <  (1; > 1; < 1) (OA;AM;OA)
4 An example
In this section I present my claims through an example. Consider the following repre-
sentation of human capital and nal good production technology respectively.
ht = (et 1) = Aet 1 ,  2 (0; 1), A > 0 (25)
f(kt) = Bk

t ,  2 (0; 1), B > 0 (26)
Lifetime utility is log linear as shown below
ut(bct; bdt+1) = log(ct   vmt ) +  log(dt+1   vot+1),  2 (0; 1) (27)
7LF;UA;OA and AM represent laissez-faire, underaccumulation, overaccumulation and ambiguous
respectively. The table is to be read as follows: as an example, with reference to row 3, if the social weight
 is greater than the laissez-faire supported social weight , competitive economy underaccumulates
both human and physical capital if the externality factor  is greater than or equal to one. However,
if the externality factor is less than one, the result is ambiguous.
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where the intertemporal discount factor is . From equation (9) I have
0(et 1) =
Rt
wt
=
Bk
 1
t
(1  )Bkt
=

(1  )kt
(28)
) Ae 1t 1 =

(1  )kt
) et 1 =


A(1  )kt
 1
 1
.
Therefore I get
ht = (et 1) = A


A(1  )kt
 
 1
. (29)
It is easy to check that the elasticity of  with respect to et 1
  
0(et 1)et 1
(et 1)
= . (30)
From equation (10) I get
Wt = wt(kt)(et 1(kt))[1  (kt)] = (1  )BktA(

A(1  )kt
)

 1 (1  )
= BA(

A(1  ))

 1 (1  )(1  )k 

 1
t
= (1  ) (1  )AB

1
A

1  
 
 1
| {z }
X
k
  
 1
t = Xk
(+ 
1  )
t (31)
and from equation (4) I have
1
(ct   vmt )
= 
1
(dt+1   vot+1)
Rt+1 (32)
along with
ct = wtht  Rtet 1   st
dt+1 = Rt+1st.
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Therefore, the consumption when they are middle aged can be calculated by
ct = wtht  Rtet 1   st = Wt   dt+1
Rt+1
(33)
= Wt   Rt+1(ct   v
m
t ) + v
o
t+1
Rt+1
. (34)
To avoid the di¢ culty in calculation, I set  = 0 which implies that there is no externality
when the agent is old. Thus
ct =
Wt +  (1  "m) dt
(1  "m) + 1 .
Hence
st = Wt   ct = Wt   Wt +  (1  "
m) dt
(1  "m) + 1
that is
st =
(1  "m)Xk(+

1  )
t
(1  "m) + 1  
 (1  "m) dt
(1  "m) + 1 which implies
st =
(1  "m)Xk(+

1  )
t
(1  "m) + 1  
 (1  "m)Rtst 1
(1  "m) + 1
using budget constraint of the agent. Since market clearing condition holds at any t, I
replace st 1 with the market clearing condition (6). Thus, given Rt = f(kt), I have
st =
(1  "m)Xk(+

1  )
t
(1  "m) + 1  
 (1  "m) Bk 1t f(kt(1 + n)A( A(1 )kt )

 1 ) + ((1 + n)( 
A(1 )kt )
1
 1 )g
(1  "m) + 1 .(35)
58
Now equating the above equation with the market clearing condition again, I have,
(1  "m)Xk( 

 1 )
t
(1  "m) + 1
 
 (1  "m) Bk 1t f(kt(1 + n)A( A(1 )kt )

 1 ) + ((1 + n)( 
A(1 )kt )
1
 1 )g
(1  "m) + 1
= kt+1(1 + n)A(

A(1  )kt+1
)

 1 + (1 + n)(

A(1  )kt+1
)
1
 1 ). (36)
For simplicity I assume that n = 0 and dene
Z1 
(1  "m)

1
A

1 
 
 1
(1  ) (1  )BA
(1  "m) + 1
Z2   (1  "
m) B
(1  "m) + 1
and
Z3 
A
1
1  (( 
(1 ))

 1 + ( 
(1 ))
1
 1 ))
(1  "m) + 1 :
Then the path of fktg1t=0, in particular, the equation (36), can be written as
(Z1   Z2Z3)k(+

1  )
t = Z3k
1
1  
t+1 ) kt+1 = (Z1   Z2Z3)1 k
+ 
t .
Given the specication of the economy, since +     < 1 always holds, the path
of fktg1t=0 is a concave function. Then if (Z1 Z2Z3) > 0 the model guarantees a positive
savings which in turn implies that
(1  "m)
 (1  "m) >
+    
(1  ) (1  ) . (37)
Note that both d
d

1  "m
 (1  "m)

< 0 and d
d"m

1  "m
 (1  "m)

> 0. Observe when
 = 0 the above condition reduces to
+    
(1  ) (1  ) < 1, which is always true since
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;  2 (0; 1). Further when "m = 0, I have (1  "
m)
 (1  "m) =
1

and when "m ! 1, I
have
(1  "m)
 (1  "m) ! 1. However when  ! 1 and "
m = 1, the ratio is undened, but at
the same time that is a meaningless model as ct = 0. Along the steady state, I get
k
CE
= (Z1   Z2Z3)
1  
1  +     .
I can compute  by equating f 0(k
CE
) = 

. Consequently k
SP
can be calculated by
k
SP
= (f 0) 1( 1

) where in this example, k
SP
=
 
B
 1
1  .
I now present a numerical example which claries my claims. Consider a particular
economy where  = 0:2,  = 0:33, A = 10, B = 10,  = 0:9. I compute the steady state
values of
n
k
CE
; kCE; hCE
o
and
n
k
SP
; kSP ; hSP
o
that are shown in Table 1 below for
di¤erent parametric values of  and "m.
Cases  "m  
n
k
CE
; hCE; kCE
o n
k
SP
; hSP ; kSP
o
(1) 0:9 0:9 0:3554 3:5714 f0:1898; 2:3434; 0:4447g f1:2687; 3:7682; 4:7807g
(2) 0:9 0:2 0:0764 0:6494 f0:2437; 2:4946; 0:6079g f0:1279; 2:1234; 0:2716g
(3) 0:2 0:9 0:5716 1:1905 f1:9877; 4:2158; 8:3799g f2:5785; 4:4992; 11:6013g
(4) 1 0:5 0:0482 1:000 f0:2251; 2:4456; 0:5505g f0:2251; 2:4456; 0:5505g
Table 1
It has already been established that the choice of  depends on the value of . But
given  > 1, if one planners social weight  is such that  < , I show that in this
case, the relationship between

kCE; hCE
	
and

kSP ; hSP
	
is not unidirectional. A
similar situation arises when a planners social weight  is such that  >  and  < 1.
I show this numerically in Table 2 and in two gures, Figure 1 and Figure 2, below. I
pick case (1) from Table 1 where the value of  is greater than 1 and  = 0:3554. I
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choose two possible values of , both being less than  = 0:3554. This result is shown
as case (10) in Table 2. When  = 0:34, competitive equilibrium underproduces and
when  = :034, competitive equilibrium overproduces both types of capital. Similarly,
in (20), where  is less than 1; I choose two possible values of  both of which are
greater than the corresponding  = 0:0764 (see case (2) in Table 1). Observe that in one
situation ( = 0:09), competitive equilibrium overproduces while in the other ( = 0:9),
it underproduces both types of capital compared to the planners economy.
Cases  "m  
n
k
CE
; hCE; kCE
o n
k
SP
; hSP ; kSP
o
(10) 0:9 0:9 0:34 3:5714 f0:1898; 2:3434; 0:4447g f1:1875; 3:7063; 4:4011g
0:034 f0:1898; 2:3434; 0:4447g f0:0382; 1:5697; 0:0600g
(20) 0:9 0:2 0:09 0:6494 f0:2437; 2:4946; 0:6079g f0:1633; 2:2571; 0:3687g
0:90 f0:2437; 2:4946; 0:6079g f5:0770; 5:3296; 27:0582g
Table 2
Insert [Figure1 : Case (10)] and [Figure2 : Case (20)] here.
5 Conclusion
Governments commonly intervene in education, typically in the form of education loans
and subsidies. The standard rationale for such intervention is a human capital exter-
nality: for the same e¤ort, people learn more if they are around smart people. The
intergenerational counterpart of this observation is that a smart generation produces a
smarter future generation. This paper make the case for government intervention in edu-
cation even when no human capital externalities are present.8 A neoclassical overlapping
8There are alternative ways to achieve e¢ ciency. I do not claim that provision of education subsidies
is the unique e¢ cient way. For example, a tax or a subsidy (enough to correct the e¤ects of the
consumption externality) on capital income, along with a lump-sum transfer can implement the planners
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generations model of human and physical capital accumulation is studied. Children bor-
row from perfect capital markets to fund education expenses. When middle-aged, they
earn income from human capital, and save in the form of physical capital. Agents are
assumed to care not just about the level of their consumption but how that compares
to those (from among their peers and the other consuming generation) living around
them. Such an intra and intergenerational consumption externality is responsible for
the possibility that agents may over or underaccumulate human and physical capital
relative to a planner, thereby justifying public intervention.
solution; also see Richter and Braun (2010). While such alternatives somewhat weaken the case for
direct government involvement in education, it can be argued that many countries nd it considerably
di¢ cult to employ instruments such as a capital-income tax, and choose direct government involvement
in education as a easier and simpler alternative.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is simple and straightforward. Taking the total derivative of either equa-
tion (8) or (19) gives
00(et)[f(kt+1)  f 0(kt+1)kt+1]det + 0(et)[ kt+1f 00(kt+1)]dkt+1   f 00(kt+1)d(kt+1) = 0
) dkt+1
det
=
00(et)[f(kt+1)  f 0(kt+1)kt+1]
f 00(kt+1)[1 + 
0(et)kt+1]
. (A.1)
Given the property of f and , I clearly have dkt+1
det
> 0 8t for both the CE and SP.
Notice that since
dkt
det 1
=
@kt
@et 1
ht   @ht
@et 1
kt
ht2
,
dkt
det 1
> 0 ) @kt
@et 1
ht   @ht
@et 1
kt > 0
) @kt
@et 1
et 1
kt
  @ht
@et 1
et 1
ht
> 0 and thus  > .
To prove dk
SP
d
> 0, at the steady state, I take the total derivative of equation (24)
which implies that
f 0(k
SP
)d+ f 00(k
SP
)dk
SP
= 0) dk
SP
d
=
 f 0(kSP )
f 00(k
SP
)
> 0. (A.2)
Using (A.1) and (A.2) I clearly have de
SP
d
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose not. Let there exist  and e,  6= e so that uCEbct
uCEbdt+1
=
uSPbct
uSPbdt+1
holds for both
 and e. Without loss of generality, assume that  > e. But if  > e, using Lemma
2, I have k
SP
() > k
SP
(e). But on the other hand, both f 0 kCE = f 0 kSP ()
and f 0

k
CE

= f 0

k
SP
(e) imply that kSP () = kSP (e) given f 0 > 0. Hence the
contradiction.
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Proof of Lemma 4
The proof is straightforward. It can directly be constituted from equation (19).
Given k
SP
(b) = kCE, I have
0(eSP (b)) = f 0(kSP (b))
f(k
SP
(b))  f 0(kSP (b))(kSP (b)) = f
0(k
CE
)
f(k
CE
)  f 0(kCE)(kCE)
= 0(eCE)
) eSP (b) = eCE by the property of ().
Proof of Proposition 5
Note that when  > 1, I have f 0

k
CE

> f 0

k
SP
()

which implies that k
CE
<
k
SP
(). But k
CE
< k
SP
() ) eSP > eCE ) hSP () > hCE. Therefore hSP () > hCE
and k
CE
< k
SP
() gives kSP () > kCE. Similarly kCE > kSP and hCE > hSP if  < 1.
And denitely kCE = kSP and hCE = hSP hold if  = 1.
Proof of Proposition 6
Given  > , I must have k
SP
() > k
SP
() since I have already proved dk
SP
d
> 0
in lemma 2. But if  > 1 holds, I must have k
SP
() > k
SP
() > k
CE
. Since lemma 2
holds, this in turn implies that hSP () > hCE and thus I also have kSP () > kCE. Also
note that if  = 1; k
SP
() > k
SP
() = k
CE
: This by the virtue of lemma 2 means that
hSP () > hCE and therefore kSP () > kCE. But when  < 1, k
CE
> k
SP
() holds along
with k
SP
() < k
SP
() which proves the relationship is ambiguous. Hence the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7
Similar to the proof of Proposition 6.
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Supplementary materials
Proof of
 
ubct
ubdt+1
!SP
= f 0(k
SP
t+1)

1+n
[Equation (22) of the manuscript]:
From (14) of the manuscript I have
tuSPbct (1  "m)  t 1uSPbdt "o = tqt (B.1)
and from (15) of the manuscript I get
 tuSPbct (1  "m) + t 1uSPbdt (1  (1  "o)) = t qt1 + n . (B.2)
Using the above two equations (by replacing qt of the rst equation by the second
expression of qt) I have
tuSPbct (1  "m)  t 1uSPbdt "o
=  tuSPbct (1  "m)(1 + n) + t 1uSPbdt (1  (1  "o))(1 + n)
) tuSPbct f(1  "m) + tuSPbct (1  "m)(1 + n)g
= t 1uSPbdt (1  (1  "o))(1 + n) + t 1uSPbdt "o
) uSPbct f(1  "m) + (1  "m)(1 + n)g
= uSPbdt f(1  (1  "o))(1 + n) + "og
) u
SPbct
uSPbdt
=
(1  (1  "o))(1 + n) + "o
(1  "m) + (1  "m)(1 + n) . (B.3)
Note that from (B.1), I can write
 uSPbct = 1(1  "m)

 qt   uSPbdt "o

. (B.4)
I now substitute  tuSPbct in the equation (B.2) by the above expression of  uSPbct (equa-
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tion B.4) and I get the following

 qt   uSPbdt "o
 (1  "m)
(1  "m) + u
SPbdt (1  (1  "o)) =  qt1 + n
)  uSPbdt "
o(1  "m)
(1  "m) + u
SPbdt (1  (1  "o)) = qt

1
1 + n
+
(1  "m)
(1  "m)

) uSPbdt

1  (1  "o)  "
o(1  "m)
(1  "m)

= qt

1
1 + n
+
(1  "m)
(1  "m)

) uSPbdt = qt

1
1+n
+ (1 "
m)
(1 "m)

n
1  (1  "o)  "o(1 "m)
(1 "m)
o
| {z }

) uSPbdt = qt where  =

1
1+n
+ (1 "
m)
(1 "m)

n
1  (1  "o)  "o(1 "m)
(1 "m)
o . (B.5)
But note that from (17) of the manuscript, I have
qt =
f 0(k
SP
t+1)
(1 + n)
qt+1. (B.6)
Thus combining (B.5) and (B.6) I have
uSPbdt = 
2f 0(k
SP
t+1)
(1 + n)
qt+1. (B.7)
Since (B.5)) uSPbdt+1 = qt+1 I have
uSPbdt+1 = qt+1 =  qt(1 + n)f 0(kSPt+1) (B.8)
substituting qt+1 by the expression in (B.6). But in (B.5), I have an expression for qt in
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terms of uSPbdt . Thus in the above expression (B.8) I replace the term qt using equation
(B.5). This implies
uSPbdt+1 = qt+1 = 
uSPbdt

(1 + n)
f 0(k
SP
t+1)

=
(1 + n)
f 0(k
SP
t+1)
uSPbdt
) uSPbdt = f
0(k
SP
t+1)
(1 + n)
uSPbdt+1. (B.9)
Thus using (B.3) and (B.9) I have
uSPbct
uSPbdt+1
=
(1  (1  "o))(1 + n) + "o
(1  "m) + (1  "m)(1 + n)| {z }

f 0(k
SP
t+1)
(1 + n)
=

(1 + n)
f 0(k
SP
t+1).
Hence the proof.
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Figures
Figure 1: Case (10)
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Figure 2: Case (20)
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CHAPTER 4. STOCHASTIC GROWTH, EDUCATION SUBSIDY AND
INVARIANT DISTRIBUTION
Modied from a paper written jointly with Krishna B. Athreya
1 Introduction
The topic on economic growth is a widely researched and a well documented one. Eco-
nomic growth models have been studied in both non-stochastic as well as in stochastic
setups. Brock and Mirman have extended the standard one sector neoclassical optimal
growth problem in a deterministic setup (see Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965), Koopmans
(1965)) to a stochastic environment. The uncertainty in this economy is generated by
the productivity shock. They show that the existence, uniqueness, and stability results
of the deterministic case can also be realized in a stochastic model under similar as-
sumptions. Signicant works in this area have also been done by Mirman (1972, 1973),
Mirman and Zilcha (1975) (also see Bhattacharya and Majumdar (2007)), Brock and
Majumdar (1978), Majumdar and Zilcha (1987), Razin and Yahav (1979), Donaldson
and Mehra (1983), Stokey et al. (1989), Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992), Amir (1997),
Nishimura and Stachurski (2005) and Stachurski (2002, 2003) among others. The is-
sues of existence, uniqueness and the stability of equilibrium in overlapping generations
model have been studied by Galor and Ryder (1989). Stachurski (2003) extended this
analysis in a stochastic environment. The proof of existence of steady state for a simple
decentralized growth model with random shock has been studied by Laitner (1981) too.
In this paper, we present an endogenous growth model in a stochastic framework.
As in De la Croix and Michel (2002), Boldrin and Montes (2004, 2005), Docquier et
al (2007), Bishnu (2009) among others, agents in our economy live for three periods.
In period one they acquire education, in period two they work and save for the future
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and in period three they consume out of their savings. In this model, the production
of the nal good not only uses physical capital but also human capital. The stochastic
nature of the model arises from the fact that production is subject to a period-wise
shock. Furthermore, human capital in each period is produced using the human capital
of the previous period and also an education subsidy which is made available through an
intergenerational tax arrangement. The income of the working class is subject to a pro-
portional tax and the tax revenue is used to subsidize education. Given this benchmark
set-up, the novelty of this paper lies in two aspects. First, we construct a growth model
in a stochastic environment where more than one sector is present and contributes to
the production of the nal good. We provide a concept of long run equilibrium in this
economy by dening an appropriate version of a balanced growth path for a stochas-
tic environment. The concept of balanced growth path has been extensively studied in
models with economic growth. Imposition of this economic condition is not only theo-
retically appealing but also empirically supported. In a non-stochastic setup, a balanced
growth path is dened where the crucial variables grow at a constant rate in line with
the Kaldor facts of economic growth. Kaldor had emphasized the phenomenon that the
growth rate of output, factor-output ratio, real interest rate, share of labor and capital
in income are roughly constant over time. This constancy of crucial ratios is an impor-
tant characterization of an economy. However, in a stochastic setup, the stocks of both
physical and human capital are random variables. So we dene the global equilibrium
of this economy in the long run as where the ratio of the two capital stocks converges
to a steady state distribution. We name it the Stochastic Balanced Growth Path. We
show that under some reasonable conditions, this steady state equilibrium exists and is
unique.
Second, we study the tax rate (and hence subsidy) at which the long run equilibrium
of our benchmark economy is able to achieve the rst best. As mentioned in the previous
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paragraph, one alternative to fund education is an education subsidy. This arrangement
involves the imposition of a proportional tax by the government on the working agents.
It then uses the tax revenue to subsidize education. To compare this with the rst
best, we infuse an alternative source of borrowing funds for education, namely a perfect
capital market. We investigate whether our benchmark economy has the capability to
follow the same growth path as an economy with a perfect capital market. We have
shown that the stochastic steady state exists and is unique for this latter economy too.
We also show that for a particular tax rate, the stochastic balanced growth path of our
benchmark economy converges to the same steady state distribution as the economy with
a perfect capital market1. Using this result we further conrm that at this particular tax
rate, the factor price ratios under the two di¤erent funding schemes also converge to the
same steady state distribution. Moreover we also prove that for any tax rate lower than
this particular tax rate, the stochastic balanced growth path rst order stochastically
dominates the balanced growth path of complete market allocation at the steady state.
The assumption of boundedness of the shock is helpful to prove this result. We should
mention at this point that in this paper we do not aim to achieve either a complete market
allocation or economic e¢ ciency from our benchmark model using a tax scheme2. Our
main purpose is to show that in a stochastic framework, an unique steady exists under
the intergenerational tax regime and this steady state distribution coincides with the
distribution of the rst best arrangement. This makes it possible to compare the two
economies along an invariant steady state. A separate study may be initiated to handle
1Note that in a non-stochastic framework, this does not imply that the allocations in these two
economies are same (Boldrin and Montes (2005)).
2In a non-stochastic setup, there are some studies which raise some concerns. In the framework of
overlapping generation model, if the present generation is selsh, why should they invest in an asset
which is valuable only to the next genartion (see Kotliko¤, Persson and Svenson (1988)). A social
contract may be designed to handle the issue of public education along with public pension (see Boldrin
(1992), Boldrin and Rustichini (2000)). Also, there is a possibility that our model may generate moral
hazard problem; young may receive funds for education but may refuse to invest when they are middle
aged and this can lead to a potential market faliure.
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the issue of e¢ ciency in our framework.
2 Background
We consider an economy consisting of an innite sequence of three-period lived gener-
ations, an initial old generation, and an innitely-lived government. In the rst period
(i.e., when they are young), agents receive subsidy from the government to invest in
their education. The agents use this education subsidy along with the human capital
that they inherit from the previous (parental) generation to produce the human capital
in this period. We assume that the agents work in the second period when they are
middle aged, and retire in the third period when they are old. Let t = 1; 2; ::: index
time. The population size of generation-t is denoted by Nt; generation-t refers to the
(middle aged) agents who work at time t. At any date t, the population size is thus
given by Nt 1 + Nt + Nt+1; since at any point in time the population consists of old,
middle-aged, and young agents. The population is assumed to grow at a constant rate,
n.
There is a single nal good in this economy and it can either be consumed in the
period it is produced, or it can be stored to yield capital in the following period. The
production of nal good has a neo-classical constant return to scale technology which
requires both physical and human capital. Thus Yt is produced using Kt and Ht where
Kt and Ht represent aggregate physical and human capital respectively at period t. But
this nal output production is subject to a multiplicative independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d) shock t at each period t. We assume that the shock  is supported
by a compact set

; 
  R+. This assumption is economically meaningful. We have
assumed that the shock is bounded but it can be noted from our proof that this assump-
tion has not been used to prove either the existence or the uniqueness of this steady state
equilibrium. We denote the cumulated density function of  by G and the associated
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probability density function by g.
Thus with per capita ht = HtNt and dening kt  ktht we have the following aggregate
production function
Yt = tF (Kt; Ht) = tHtf(kt) (1)
The restrictions on f are as follows; it is positive, strictly increasing and strictly concave
in its argument that is f > 0, f 0 > 0 and f 00 < 0. For the purpose of analytical
tractability, capital is assumed to depreciate fully between periods. Thus in this economy,
the only uncertainty that we experience is the productivity shock. Note that kt represents
the factor intensity ratio which is very crucial in this analysis.
At every t, a linear tax is imposed on the income of the present middle aged agents
and the tax revenue is transferred to the present young to fund the production of human
capital. This constant tax rate on income is denoted by . Moreover, since we consider an
innitely lived government, it is equivalent to saying that in this economy the government
is the only source of funding for producing human capital. When the generation-t agents
are young in period t  1, human capital or e¤ective labor supply is produced using the
human capital they have inherited from their parental generation as well as the education
subsidy that is made available to them by the government. More precisely, if ht 1 is the
per capita human capital inherited from parents and et 1 is the amount of investment
in education in period t  1 by a generation-t agent, per capita human capital produced
by the middle aged agents at t is given by
ht = (et 1; ht 1) (2)
We assume that the function  is homogenous of degree one and therefore we can write
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it in its intensive form as
ht = ht 1(
et 1
ht 1
; 1) = ht 1(
et 1
ht 1
) = ht 1(et 1) (3)
where et is dened as
et
ht
. () is strictly increasing, strictly concave and satises the
Inada conditions that is 0() > 0, 00() < 0 with 0(0) =1, 0(1) = 0.
An agent of generation-t consumes only when she is middle aged at t and old at
t+ 1. She does not derive utility either from her consumption or from leisure when she
is young. In the second period of her life at t, she decides her middle-aged consumption
level, ct and her saving st at the gross interest rate Rt+1. In period t + 1; when the
agent is old, she retires and consumes the return on her saving. Agents have a von-
Neumann Morgenstern, time-separable utility function over consumption of nal goods.
This lifetime expected utility of an agent is given by
EUt  u(ct) + Etu(dt+1) (4)
where ct and dt+1 represent the consumptions when they are middle aged and old respec-
tively. The parameter  represents the temporal discount factor which lies in between 0
and 1. Et stands for expectation which is formed at period t for consumption in period
t+1. We impose standard assumptions on the utility function u; it is strictly increasing
and concave that means u0 > 0 and u00 < 0. In the next section we formally present the
problem of an agent in an economy where the government provides education subsidy
for education.
2.1 Agents problem under education subsidy
In a competitive setup, remuneration of the factors of productions are determined ac-
cording to their marginal productivities. Since the nal good at each period is produced
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using the physical and human capital available in that particular period, it can easily
be shown that
Rt(kt;t) = tf
0(kt) (5)
wt(kt;t) = t[f(kt)  ktf 0(kt)] (6)
where Rt and wt stand for gross rate of return on physical and human capital at period
t respectively. We denote the factor price ratio at t as (kt;t). It is clear from the
above two equations that the factor price ratio can be represented as a function of the
ratio of factor intensities namely kt, that is, (kt;t) =
wt(kt;t)
Rt(kt;t)
.
In this setup, the agents consider these factor prices as given when they maximize
their lifetime expected utility. At each date t, the agents of generation- t maximize EUt
subject to their income constraint. Since wt is the wage rate, agents receive a gross
income of wtht when they acquire ht amount of human capital. Note that agents do not
optimally choose the education in this model. Rather they accept the amount of funds
that they receive from the government as given. A generation-t agent produces human
capital at t   1 and forms her expectation over lifetime utility for the remaining two
remaining periods. This is equivalent to maximizing the expected life time utility at t
given the agent has already produced human capital in t  1.
To meet the amount of subsidy for the current young, the government imposes a per
capita proportional tax at the rate of  on the wage income of the middle aged agents.
Thus at each t, a per capita total tax of wtht is collected from each of the middle aged
agents, whose population size is Nt at t. Note that since tax is imposed after the output
is realized, the government does not face any uncertainty with respect to the tax revenue
(and hence subsidy) once the output is realized. In this model, government has only two
roles to play once the output is realized. At each t it collects Ntwtht as revenue and
uses this to provide a per capita subsidy of an amount et to those who are young at t
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and has a cohort size of Nt+1. We assume that at each date t the budget is balanced.
Thus formally
Ntwtht = Nt+1et 8t (7)
) et = wtht
(1 + n)
8t.
Note that in this setup, agents take the decision of how much to consume but not how
much to invest in education, since the education is funded by the government. Thus
agents do not choose education optimally.
Agents maximize their lifetime expected utility (4) subject to budget constraints to
make the decision about their levels of consumption and saving. Formally, the maxi-
mization problem is
max
st
u(ct) + Etu(dt+1)
subject to the following constraints
ct = (1  )wtht   st (8)
dt+1 = Rt+1st. (9)
The optimality condition is straight forward. It describes the optimum intertemporal
consumption-saving decision of the agent and is characterized by the following
u0(ct) = Etu0(dt+1)Rt+1
Next we focus on the market clearing condition for this economy. The collective
saving of the middle aged agents becomes capital stock for the next period. We assume
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that the market clearing condition is satised at each date t and thus can be written as
Ntst = Kt+1 8t
) st = (1 + n)kt+1ht+1 8t. (10)
We are now in a position to dene an equilibrium of this competitive economy We
call this competitive equilibrium as a Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium (DCE).
Denition 1 A Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) in this economy is a sequence
kt
	1
t=0
with initial condition k0 > 0 such that at every t an agent maximizes her ex-
pected lifetime utility EUt subject to the budget constraint, nal good Yt is produced
using physical capital (Kt) and human capital (Ht), factors are paid according to their
marginal productivities (that is, equations (5) and (6) hold), balanced budget condition
(equation (7)) holds with equality and the market clearing condition (that is, equation
(10)) is satised.
In order to make the model analytically tractable, in the remaining analysis, we
assume some specic functional forms. We assume that the instantaneous utility function
u has a logarithmic representation. It can be easily checked that given this representation
of the utility function, interest rates have no overall e¤ect on consumption. We also
assume that the human capital and nal good production functions at each date t take
the following forms respectively
(et 1) = Aet 1 (11)
yt = tf(kt) = tBk

t . (12)
From the above specications, one can easily verify that ht = (et 1; ht 1) = Aet 1h
1 
t 1 =
ht 1(et 1) and Yt = tF (Kt; Ht) = tBK

t H
1 
t . Without loss of generality, we can
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assume that B = 1. Since remuneration of the factors of production are determined in
a competitive market, it can easily be shown that
Rt = tf
0(kt) = tBk
 1
t (13)
wt = t[f(kt)  ktf 0(kt)] = t(1  )Bkt . (14)
Using the above two equations, we clearly have (kt) =
wt(kt;t)
Rt(kt;t)
= 
1 kt.
In the following theorem we present a characterization of the optimal path for ef-
fective capital in the above discussed economy. Interestingly we have been able to nd
out a nice and manageable expression for kt+1 in terms of kt and reach to the following
conclusion.
Theorem 2 The competitive equilibrium produces a log-linear stochastic process given
by
kt+1 =  G(t; kt)  1 t k
(1 )
t (15)
where
  (1  )[(1  )B]
1 
(1 + )A(1 + n)1 
. (16)
Proof. Shown in the appendix.
2.1.1 Invariant state under the economy with education subsidy
Conventionally in a non-stochastic case, a balanced growth path is dened as a situation
where the ratio of two capital stocks is constant over time. We dene an equivalent
version of a balanced growth path in our model and we term it as stochastic balanced
growth path(SBGP). The concept of stochastic balanced growth path is an invariant
distribution of the ratio of two types of capital stock. That means while the balanced
growth path in a non-stochastic environment is a constant ratio of two stocks of capital,
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here in the stochastic case, it is an invariant distribution of the ratio of the two stocks
as time moves. It can equivalently be characterized as a long run equilibrium in our
model. Before we formally dene a stochastic growth path, we rst provide the standard
denition of invariant distribution of the markov process kt below.
Denition 3 Let

kt
	
t>1 is dened over a probability space (
;F ; P ). A probability
measure  over (
;F) is called an invariant distribution for kt if
(B) =
Z
P (k;B)(dk) 8B 2 B.
Using the above denition, we now dene our long run equilibrium as a stochastic
balanced growth path.
Denition 4 (Stochastic Balanced Growth Path or SBGP) A distribution G denes a
SBGP if the invariant distribution of k is represented by the distribution G.
We now show that under a very mild condition, a balanced growth path exists for
the above economy. Theorem 5 below presents the results related to the existence and
uniqueness of the growth path for our benchmark economy. As discussed earlier, we do
not need the assumption of boundedness to show the existence of the balanced growth
path.
Theorem 5 (Existence of SBGP) Let E jln "0j < 1 where "t  ln  + (1   ) lnt.
Then for any initial distribution of k0, kt converges in distribution, that is, there exists
a SBGP for the above economy. Further, kt
d ! e where  
1

j=0
j"j,   (1   )
and (:) = P (e 2 :) is an invariant probability measure for kt	. The SBGP of this
economy is also unique and it has a non atomic distribution.
Proof. The theorem can be easily proved using the proposition 1 of Athreya and Pan-
tula (1986) (Also see Bhattacharya and Waymire (1990), Bhattacharya and Majumdar
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(2007)). First of all, f"tg are i.i.d and jj < 1 where   (1 ), "t  ln +(1 ) lnt.
Note that a logarithmic transformation of the above recursive relation (15) can be writ-
ten as
ln kt+1 = ln  + (1  ) lnt + (1  ) ln kt (17)
Next we denote t  ln kt. Then equation (17) can be written as
t+1 = t + "t; t > 0 (18)
Note that
t+1 = 
t+10 +
t+1

j=1
j"t+1 j. (19)
Since 0, 1, ....n are all determined by f0; "0; ::::"n 1g and "n is independent of "n 1,
for every Borel set B, P (t+1 2 B j f0; 1; ::::ng) = Q(B t) where Q is the common
distribution of the random variables "t. Therefore, ftgt>0 is a markov process in R1 with
transition probability p(x;B)  Q(B   x) and initial 0. Observe that since f"tg are
i.i.d.,
t+1

j=1
j"t+1 j and
t+1

j=1
j"j have the same distribution. Also since  < 1, t+10 ! 0 as
t!1 almost surely. Then using Borel Cantelli Lemma, we have
t+1

j=1
j"j  !  
1

j=0
j"j
almost surely when E jln "0j < 1. And nally t  ln kt d !  ) kt d ! e. Also it is
obvious that (:) is a stationary for

kt
	
: Since t+1 = 
t+10 +
t+1

j=1
j"t+1 j and t+1 
t+10+
t+1

j=1
j"j have the same distribution, they both converge to the same distribution.
Hence the invariant distribution for this markov process is unique. Since exponential
function is a strictly increasing one, the proof follows automatically3.
Note that the above result can partially be viewed as a generalization of the results
(which includes human capital) of Galor and Ryder (1989) when their model is extended
to a stochastic endogenous growth setup. Stachurski (2003) has provided some conditions
3Note that boundedness of shock is not required to prove the existence. It is not required to prove
the following three theorems either.
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under which a unique and globally stable stochastic equilibrium exists in a model without
human capital.
Note that using Lai and Wei (1982) one can prove that t has a continuous distri-
bution provided "0 is not degenerate. Therefore it is straight forward to show that e
has a continuous distribution. Further, using Athreya and Pantula (1986), we have the
following result.
Theorem 6 If "0 has a non trivial absolutely continuous component then  is fully
absolutely continuous.
Proof. See Proposition 2 of Athreya and Pantula (1986).
It is also easy to verify that applying the law of large number (LLN) we can present
the following theorem.
Theorem 7 For any function h such that E jh()j <1, 1
n
1

j=0
h(j)  ! E(h()) almost
surely.
Proof. The proof can be constructed by applying law of large number (LLN) (see for
e.g., Athreya and Lahiri (2006) for detail).
3 Presence of a perfect capital market
In this section we compare our benchmark economy with education subsidy to an econ-
omy where there exists a perfect capital market in order to see whether the same growth
path can be achieved by our benchmark economy for any particular tax rate. Though
in reality, the presence of a perfect capital market is rare (see Becker 1975, Kehoe and
Levine 2000, Boldrin and Montes 2003, Bishnu 2009), the motivation behind this exer-
cise is to investigate whether a benchmark economy like ours has the ability to follow
the same growth path as an economy with complete market allocations. We should also
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mention at this point that in this paper, we were less concerned about the welfare issue;
rather we focus on the growth path. More specically, our aim is to nd the tax rate
at which our benchmark economy with educational subsidy and an intergenerational
transfer generates the same growth path as an economy with a perfect capital market.
For this purpose, we assume that there is no government intervention in the education
sector. However, there exists a perfect capital market where the young agents can borrow
funds to nance their education. The agents then use this fund together with the stock of
human capital available from their previous generations to produce their human capital.
These young agents repay their debt when they are middle aged in the next period.
Note that here agents can optimally choose their level of education by choosing the
amount of funds they borrow. This is a point of diversion from our benchmark economy.
Therefore, in a competitive set up agents choose their level of saving as well as the
amount of capital they need to borrow for their education. Since the capital market is
the only source of funding for education, as we shall see later, the rate of interest on
borrowing for education can safely be ignored. This result is in fact not very surprising.
The absence of heterogeneity in the model along with the facts that agents do not
maximize utility when they are young and that agents must borrow for their survival,
lead to this result.
An agent of generation t borrows an amount of et 1 in period t   1 from a perfect
capital market and invests in education. Thus when an agent receives a level of human
capital ht 1 from his parental generation, the human capital production function can be
written as
ht = (et 1; ht 1). (20)
Agents earn wages when they are middle aged and repay the funds they borrowed
for education. Naturally we do not have any balanced budget condition here. Since a
part of the collective savings of the middle aged is used to nance education for the
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young and the remaining amount becomes capital stock for the next period, the market
clearing condition can be written as Ntst = Kt+1 +Nt+1et which means
st = kt+1(1 + n)ht+1 + (1 + n)et. (21)
3.1 Agents problem under perfect capital market
An agent born at t 1 chooses an amount of investment towards human capital so that it
maximizes her expected lifetime utility. Then she chooses her optimal saving, given she
has already chosen the amount of capital she wants to borrow for her education. We solve
the problem backwards in two stages. First, given the level of funds she has borrowed,
she maximizes her expected utility by optimally choosing her level of consumption and
hence the level of saving. In the next step, we solve for the optimal level of borrowing
amount by maximizing her expected indirect utility.
Thus an agent born at t   1 solves the following maximization problem at t given
et 1:
max
st
EUt  u(ct) + Etu(dt+1) (22)
subject to
ct = wtht  Rtet 1   st;
dt+1 = Rt+1st.
Assuming interior solutions, the rst order condition of a generation-t agents problem
is characterized by
st : u
0(ct) = Etu0(dt+1)Rt+1. (23)
This optimality condition is straight forward. It simply describes the optimum intertem-
poral consumption-saving decision of the agent. Given the logarithmic utility function,
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using the above equation, we have
st =
 (wtht  Rtet 1)
1 + 
. (24)
Thus we can write the expected indirect utility vt as
vt = log[
1
1 + 
(wtht  Rtet 1)] + Et[logRt+1f 
1 + 
(wtht  Rtet 1)g].
In the next step, choosing et 1 by maximizing the above indirect utility function gives
the following relation
wt 
0(et 1) = Rt ) 0(et 1) = Rt
wt
. (25)
We now dene the steady state in this set up as well:
Denition 8 A Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) in this economy is a sequence
kt
	1
t=0
with initial condition k0 > 0 such that at every t, an agent maximizes her ex-
pected lifetime utility EUt subject to the budget constraint, nal good Yt is produced using
physical capital (Kt) and human capital (Ht), factor prices Rt and wt are determined ac-
cording to their marginal productivities and the market clearing condition (i.e., equation
(21)) is satised.
The following theorem states the path of the physical to human capital ratio in this
economy.
Theorem 9 The competitive equilibrium of this economy with a perfect capital market
also produces a log-linear stochastic process given by
kt+1   P (t; kt) = 1 t k
(1 )
t (26)
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where
 
"
(1  )(1  )B
(1 + ) f + (1  )g (1 + n)AfA(1 )

g 1 
#1 
. (27)
Proof. Shown in the appendix.
3.1.1 Invariant state under a perfect capital market
Theorem 10 (Existence of SBGP) Let E jlne"0j <1 where e"t  ln +(1 ) lnt andet  ln kt; . Then for any initial distribution of k0, kt converges in distribution, that
is, there exists a SBGP for the above economy. Further, kt
d ! ee where e  1
j=0
je"j,
  (1   ) and (:) = P (ee 2 :) is an invariant probability measure for kt	. The
SBGP of this economy is also unique and it has a non atomic distribution.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.
The following two theorems are similar in spirit to theorems 6 and 7.
Theorem 11 If e"0 has a non trivial absolutely continuous component then e is fully
absolutely continuous.
Theorem 12 For any function h such that E jh(e)j < 1, 1
n
1

j=0
h(ej)  ! E(h(e)) al-
most surely.
4 Observations
Proposition 13 There exists a unique tax rate  =  for which the economy with
education subsidy shares the same path of a rst best economy.
Proof. Let us dene the term V ()  

,  > 0. It can easily be checked that V ()
exists since  6= 0: Note that lim
!0
V ()!1 and lim
!1
V ()! 0. Since we have assumed
that  2 (0; 1), by continuity of V (), there exists a  =  such that V () = 1. Further,
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it can also be checked that V 0() < 0, i.e., V () is strictly monotonically decreasing in
. Hence the proof.
For the purpose of notational convenience, from this point onwards we denote the
path of kt+1 in an economy with a perfect capital market by
kt+1; =  P (t; kt; ) = 
1 
t k
(1 )
t; where (28)
 =
"
(1  )(1  )B
(1 + ) f + (1  )g (1 + n)AfA(1 )

g 1 
#1 
.
Thus the path of kt+1 associated with the subsidized economy and an economy with a
perfect capital market are denoted by kt+1; and kt+1; respectively. We now focus on
the steady state of these two paths. We start by determining the transition function. We
should mention here that to prove the following lemma and the proposition, we found
Hauenschild (2002) very helpful. We have also provided an alternative proof of our main
claim but for the proof of stochastic dominance, we follow the method of Hauenschild
(2002).
The transition function of

kt;
	
and

kt;
	
is denoted by Pi(kt; B), i = ;  respec-
tively where
Pi(kt; B) =
Z
1Bkt;i
(t)dG(t)
8kt > 0 and 8B 2 B+, Borel--algebra over R+. While Bkt;i 

t :  i(t; kt;i) 2 B
	
,
1Bkt;i
(t) represents an indicator function, that is.
1Bkt;i
(t) =
8><>: 1 if t 2 Bkt;i0 otherwise. .
Lemma 14 Let both the processes kt+1; and kt+1; start from the same initial value of
kt=0, say k0 > 0. Then kt+1; > kt+1; for all t on almost all the paths whenever the tax
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rate  <  .
Proof. We need to show that Pf! 2 
 : kt+1;(!) > kt+1; (!)g = 1. From t = 0 to
t = 1 it can easily be checked that
k1; =  (t=0; kt=0;) = 
1 
t=0 k
(1 )
t=0; > 
1 
t=0 k
(1 )
t=0; =   (t=0; kt=0; ) = k1;
since  >  and t = 0. Thus what remains to be shown is that our claim holds from
any t to (t+ 1). Assuming that kt; > kt; , it is easy to show that kt+1; > kt+1; holds
for any t when  <  . Therefore by induction, kt+1; > kt+1; holds for any t. Hence the
proof.
Denition 15 Let  and  denote probability distributions with support T  R+ and
let the corresponding cumulated density functions be Fand G respectively. Then  is
said to dominate  in the sense of First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD) if the
inequality G(t) 6 F (t) holds for all t and if G(t0) < F (t0) for at least one t0 2 T .
The above denition indicates that in the sense of FOSD, the probability distribution
of a SBGP associated with higher tax rate in an economy dominates the corresponding
distribution of SBGP associated with relatively lower tax rate.
Proposition 16 An SBGP with tax rate  <  First order Stochastically Dominates
an SBGP with tax rate  and thus E(k) > E(k ).
Proof. We start the proof with t = t0 + 1. Notice that for any x > 0
Ft0+1;(x) = t0+1;((0; x]) =
Z
P(kt=0;; (0; x])t0;(dkt=0;)
and
Ft0+1; (x) = t0+1; ((0; x]) =
Z
P (kt=0; ; (0; x])t0; (dkt=0; ).
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Since the two economies share the same starting point, to have
Ft0+1;(x) < Ft0+1; (x) (29)
it is su¢ cient to show that P(kt=0;; (0; x]) < P (kt=0; ; (0; x]). Since from Lemma 14,
kt+1; > kt+1; holds for any t, for t = t0, we have kt0+1; > kt0+1; for all possible t=0,
that is, for all t0. This in turn implies that for any kt=0;i

t0 : kt+1; 2 (0; x]
	  t0 : kt+1; 2 (0; x]	 . (30)
Note that (30) implies P(kt=0;; (0; x]) < P (kt=0; ; (0; x]) and thus the result holds for
t = t0. In the next step we show that Ft+1;(x) 6 Ft+1; (x) holds for any t. Without
loss of generality we assume that Ft;(x) 6 Ft; (x) holds at t. Given this, we prove that
Ft+1;(x) 6 Ft+1; (x) for any x. Note that for any t and x > 0 and kt we have
Ft+1;(x) = t+1;((0; x]) =
Z
P(kt(0; x])t;(dkt;)
and
Ft+1; (x) = t+1; ((0; x]) =
Z
P ((kt; (0; x])t; (dkt; ).
We do not use subscript  or  when the corresponding values are same. First we show
that
Ft+1;(x) = t+1;((0; x]) =
Z
P(kt; (0; x])t;(dkt;) 6
Z
P(kt; (0; x])t; (dkt; ).
Let ft; and ft; are the associated probability density functions associated with t; and
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t; . Thus
Z
P(kt; (0; x])t;(dkt;) 
Z
P((kt; (0; x])t; (dkt; ) (31)
=
Z
P((kt; (0; x])(ft;(kt)  ft; (kt))dkt.
At this stage we should nd out P((kt; (0; x]) in our set up. Since we have assumed
that the shock is bounded, it can be shown that
P((kt; (0; x]) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 if kt 6 k
(1)
x
G
 
x
1
1 

1
1 
 k

t
!
if kt 2 (k(1)x ; k
(2)
x )
0 if kt 6 k
(2)
x
where
k
(1)
x =
 
x

1 
! 1
(1 )
and k
(2)
x =

x

1 
 1
(1 )
.
Thus (31) can be written as
Z
P((kt; (0; x])(ft;(kt)  ft; (kt))dkt
=
Z
(0;k
(1)
x; ]
1:(ft;(kt)  ft; (kt))dkt +
Z
(k
(1)
x; ;k
(2)
x;)
G
 
x
1
1 

1
1 
 k

t
!
(ft;(kt)  ft; (kt))dkt
= Ft;(k
(1)
x )  Ft; (k
(1)
x ) +G
 
x
1
1 

1
1 
 k

t
! 
Ft;(kt)  Ft; (kt)
 
(k
(1)
x; ;k
(2)
x;)
(32)
 
Z
(k
(1)
x; ;k
(2)
x;)
@G
@kt
 
x
1
1 

1
1 
 k

t
!
(Ft;(kt)  Ft; (kt))dkt. (33)
Given the assumption, the above equation is enough to prove the rst part. In the next
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step we show that
Z
P(kt; (0; x])t; (dkt; ) 6
Z
P (kt; (0; x])t; (dkt; ).
The above inequality can be written as
Z 
P(kt; (0; x])  P (kt; (0; x])
	
t; (dkt; ) 6 0. (34)
Since the outer integral is same, to prove (34) it is enough to show that P(kt; (0; x]) 6
P (kt; (0; x]). It can be easily veried using an induction similar to the one used at the
beginning of the proof that the above relation holds at any t. Hence the proof.
If an SBGP with tax rate  First order Stochastically Dominates a SBGP with tax
rate  ; it implies that E(k) > E(k ) holds but the converse is not necessarily true.
Thus, showing that E(k) > E(k ) holds is not enough to claim that a SBGP with tax
rate  First order Stochastically Dominates a SBGP with tax rate  . We now provide
an alternative proof to establish that E(k) > E(k ) holds.
An alternative proof of E(k) > E(k ) when  <  :
Proof. From theorems 5 and 12 we know that for both j = j;ej and for any function
h such that E jh()j < 1, 1
n
1

j=0
h(j)  ! E(h()) almost surely. Note that like (19),
(28) can be written as
et+1 = et + e"t; t > 0. (35)
We next dene   "t   e"t. We do not put any time subscript for  since it can be
easily checked that  is time invariant. We nd that
 = log


.
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It can also be checked that given our specication,  > 0. Dene E  E  ee E (e)
and we show that E < 0. Note that
E = E
 
e
1

j=0
je"j!  E e 1j=0j"j!
) E = E
 
e
1

j=0
j("j )
!
  E
 
e
1

j=0
j"j
!
= E
 
e
1

j=0
j("j )   e
1

j=0
j"j
!
=

1
e

1 
  1

E
 
e
1

j=0
j"j
!
< 0.
Thus E(k) > E(k ).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider an economy where agents receive a subsidy from the govern-
ment to fund their education. This subsidy is made available through a proportional
tax scheme that is imposed on the working generation. The tax revenue is used to fund
this education subsidy in a way so that the budget is balanced. The production of the
nal good uses both human and physical capital. Furthermore, this production process
is subject to a shock. This gives rise to a stochastic environment. We dene a steady
state equilibrium in this stochastic setup and discuss the concept of a balanced growth
path in this framework. We show that under reasonable assumptions this steady state
exists and is unique. We further show that for a particular tax rate, this benchmark
economy shares the same steady state distribution as an economy with a perfect capital
market and thus rst best. Moreover, it has been shown that for a tax rate lower than
this particular tax rate, the steady state of our benchmark economy rst order stochas-
tically dominates the steady state of the latter economy where a perfect capital market
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is present.
References
[1] Amir, R., A new look at optimal growth under uncertainty, Journal of. Economic.
Dynamics and. Control 22 (1997), 6786.
[2] Athreya, K. B., Lahiri, S., Measure theory and probability theory, Springer. 2006
[3] Athreya, K. B., Pantula, Sastry G., Mixing Properties of Harris Chains and Au-
toregressive Processes, Journal of Applied Probability 23 (1986), 880-892
[4] Becker, G., S., University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1975)
[5] Bhattacharya, R., Majumdar, M., On a class of stable random dynamical systems:
theory and applications, Journal of Economic Theory 96 (2001), 208-291
[6] Bhattacharya, R., Majumdar, M., Random dynamical systems, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, (2007)
[7] Bhattacharya, R., Waymire, E. C., Stochastic Processes with Applications (1990),
Wiley, New York
[8] Bishnu, M., Government Intervention in Education in the Presence of Consumption
Externalities, working paper
[9] Boldrin, M., Public Education and Capital Accumulation" (C.M.S.E.M.S. Discus-
sion Paper 1017 Northwestern University) (1992)
[10] Boldrin, M., Montes, A., Assessing the e¢ ciency of public education and pensions,
Unpublished, 2004
96
[11] Boldrin, M., Montes, A., The intergenerational state education and pensions, Re-
view of Economic Studies 72 (2005) 651664.
[12] Boldrin, M., Rustichini A., Political Equilibria with Social Security". Review of
Economic Dynamics, 3 (2000) 41-78
[13] Brock, W. A., Majumdar, M., Global asymptotic stability results for multisector
models of optimal growth under uncertainty when future utilities are discounted,
Journal of Economic Theory 18 (1978), 225243
[14] Cass, D., Optimum growth in an aggregative model of capital accumulation, Review
of Economic Studies 32 (1965), 233240
[15] De la Croix, D., Michel, P., A Theory of Economic Growth: Dynamics and Policy
in Overlapping Generations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.
[16] Donaldson, J. B., Mehra, R., Stochastic growth with correlated production shocks,
Journal of Economic Theory 29 (1983), 282312.
[17] Docquier, F., Paddison, O., Pestieau, P.,Optimal accumulation in an endogenous
growth setting with human capital. Journal of Economic Theory 134, pp 361-378
[18] Galor, O., Ryder, H. E., Existence, uniqueness and stability of equilibrium in an
overlapping generations model with productive capital. Journal of Economic Theory
49 (1989), 360375.
[19] Hauenschild, N., Capital accumulation in a stochastic overlapping generation model
with social security. Journal of Economic Theory 106 (2002), pp 201-216
[20] Hopenhayn, H. A., Prescott, E. C., Stochastic monotonicity and stationary distri-
butions for dynamic economies. Econometrica 60 (1992),13871406
97
[21] Kehoe, T J., Levine, D. K., Liquidity Constrained Markets versus Debt Constrained
Markets, Econometrica 69 (2000),575-598.
[22] Koopmans, T., On the concept of optimal economic growth, Pontif. Acad. Sci. 28
(1965), 225300.
[23] Kotliko¤, L. J., Persson, T., Svensson, L. E. O., Social Contracts as Assets: A
Possible Solution to the Ttme Consistency Problem". American Economic Review
78 (1988) 662-677.
[24] Lai, T. L., Wei, C.A., Least squares estimates in stochastic regression models with
applications to identication and control of dynamic systems. Annals of Statistics
(1982) 10, 154-166.
[25] Laitner, J., The steady states of a stochastic decentralized growth model, Journal
of Economic Theory 24 (1981), 377392.
[26] Majumdar, M., Zilcha, I., Optimal growth in a stochastic environment: Some sen-
sitivity and turnpike results, Journal of Economic Theory 43 (1987), 116133.
[27] Mirman, L. J., On the existence of steady state measures for one sector growth
models with uncertain technology, International Economic Review 13 (1972), 271
286.
[28] Mirman, L. J., The steady state behavior of a class of one sector growth models
with uncertain technology, Journal of Economic Theory 6 (1973), 219242.
[29] Mirman L. J., Zilcha, I., On optimal growth under uncertainty, Journal of Economic
Theory 11 (1975), 329339.
[30] Nishimura, K., Stachurski, J., Stability of stochastic optimal growth models: a new
approach, Journal of Economic Theory 122 (2005) 100118.
98
[31] Ramsey, F. P., A mathematical theory of saving, Economic Journal 38 (1928), 543
559.
[32] Razin A., Yahav, J. A., On stochastic models of economic growth, International
Economic Review 20 (1979), 599604.
[33] Stachurski, J., Economic dynamical systems with multiplicative noise. Journal of
Mathematical Economics 39 (2003), 135-152.
[34] Stachurski, J., Stochastic Optimal Growth with Unbounded Shock, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 106, 4065 (2002).
[35] Stokey, N. L., Lucas, R. E., Prescott E. C., Recursive Methods in Economic Dy-
namics, (1989) Harvard University Press, MA.
[36] Wang, Y., Stationary equilibria in an overlapping generations economy with sto-
chastic production. Journal of Economic Theory 61 (1993), 423435.
99
Appendix
1. Obtaining Equation (15) in Theorem 2:
Given logarithmic form of utility function and using the optimality condition, we
have
1
ct
= Efu0(dt+1)Rt+1g
) 1
ct
=

st
) [(1  )wtht   st] = st
) st = (1  )
1 + 
wtht. (36)
Now using market clearing equation (10), we have
st = (1 + n)kt+1ht+1 ) (1  )
1 + 
wtht = (1 + n)kt+1ht+1
) kt+1 =
(1 )
1+
wtht
(1 + n)ht+1
=
(1  )wtht
(1 + )(1 + n)ht+1
. (37)
Given (et 1) = Aet 1 in equation (11), and ht = ht 1(et 1), we have
ht+1
ht
= (et) = Ae

t .
Thus using the above equation and equation (37), we have
kt+1 =
(1  )wtht
(1 + )(1 + n)ht+1
=
(1  )wt
(1 + )(1 + n)ht+1
ht
) kt+1 = (1  )wt
(1 + )(1 + n)Aet
. (38)
Now from the balanced budget condition (7),
et =
wtht
(1 + n)
) et
ht
 et = wt
(1 + n)
. (39)
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From the last two equations, we have
kt+1 =
(1  )wt
(1 + )(1 + n)Aet
=
(1  )wt
(1 + )(1 + n)A[
wt
(1 + n)
]
) kt+1 = (1  )w
1 
t
(1 + )(1 + n)1 A
. (40)
Since from (14), wt = t(1  )Bkt , we have
kt+1 =
(1  )w1 t
(1 + )(1 + n)1 A
=
(1  )
n
t(1  )Bkt
o1 
(1 + )(1 + n)1 A
) kt+1 = (1  ) f(1  )Bg
1 
(1 + )A(1 + n)1 
1 t k
(1 )
t
which is equation (15). Hence the proof.
2. Obtaining Equation (26) in Theorem 9:
From the market clearing condition under perfect capital market, namely equation
(21), we have
st = kt+1(1 + n)ht+1 + (1 + n)et
kt+1 =
st
(1 + n)ht+1
  et
ht+1
=
st
(1 + n)ht+1
  et
Ah1 t et
) kt+1 = st
(1 + n)ht+1
  e
1 
t
A
. (41)
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From equation (24), we have
st =
 (wtht  Rtet 1)
1 + 
) st =  [wtht   wt
0(et 1)et 1]
1 + 
using equation (25)
) st = 
1 + 
wtht

1  
0(et 1)et 1
(et 1)ht 1

) st = 
1 + 
wtht

1  
0(et 1)et 1
(et 1)

=

1 + 
wtht [1  ] . (42)
Thus using equations (41) and (42), we have
kt+1 =
 [1  ]wtht
(1 + )(1 + n)ht+1
  e
1 
t
A
) kt+1 =  [1  ]wt
(1 + )(1 + n)ht+1
ht
  e
1 
t
A
) kt+1 =  [1  ]wt
(1 + )(1 + n)(et)
  e
1 
t
A
. (43)
But from equation (25), we have
0(et 1) =
Rt
wt
=

1  k
 1
t
) Ae 1t 1 =

1  k
 1
t ) e 1t 1 =

A(1  )k
 1
t
) 1
e1 t
=

A(1  )kt+1
. (44)
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Thus from (43), we have
kt+1 =
 [1  ]wt
(1 + )(1 + n)(et)
  A(1  )kt+1
A
) kt+1 + A(1  )kt+1
A
=
 [1  ]wt
(1 + )(1 + n)(et)
) kt+1 = (1  )wt
(1 + ) f + (1  )g (1 + n)(et)
) kt+1 = (1  )t(1  )Bk

t
(1 + ) f + (1  )g (1 + n)(et)
) kt+1 = (1  )t(1  )Bk

t
(1 + ) f   (1  )g (1 + n)Aet
) kt+1 = (1  )t(1  )Bk

t
(1 + ) f + (1  )g (1 + n)AfA(1 )

kt+1g 1 
) k
1
1 
t+1 =
(1  )t(1  )Bkt
(1 + ) f + (1  )g (1 + n)AfA(1 )

g 1 
) kt+1 =
"
(1  )(1  )B
(1 + ) f + (1  )g (1 + n)AfA(1 )

g 1 
#1 
1 t k
(1 )
t
which is equation (26). Hence the proof.
